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This study articulates the perceptions and expectations different stakeholders in sanitation 
infrastructure upgrades have to determine the implications their contrasting views have towards 
the success of participatory upgrades. The success of public infrastructure projects, such as 
sanitation infrastructure upgrades, requires balancing issues relating to technical and financial 
feasibility as well as social considerations.  
Community participation is believed to be an effective means to addressing social issues relating 
to public infrastructure projects and improving project success by including communities in 
decision-making processes. In South Africa, community participation processes have been 
mandated for use in large infrastructure projects – particularly when upgrading informal 
settlements. However, in practice, evidence suggests that, in some instances, the 
implementation of community participation processes have been reduced to a tick-boxing 
exercise, providing communities with little to no agency.  
Research reviewed found that one of the factors contributing to the poor project success is the 
neglect of participatory processes in projects, as different expectations and motivations held by 
stakeholders are not addressed. This study involved a review on legislation involving sanitation 
infrastructure and community participation processes relating to the Upgrading of Informal 
Settlements Programme (UISP) in particular.  
The investigation was conducted using the single case study of Project Silvertown, the 
controversial project that in 2010 was coined by the media as the “toilet war saga” in Cape 
Town’s Khayelitsha township. The project was implemented in terms of the UISP with the 
controversy revolving around the installation of 1 316 unenclosed toilets provided by the City 
of Cape Town.  
A systems thinking-based framework called Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) was used to 
articulate the views of the different stakeholders involved in Project Silvertown. CSH makes 
use of a set of 12 questions aimed to make explicit the various value judgements upon which 
different stakeholder groups frame their understanding and beliefs. CSH maps the bigger picture 
in any given social intervention by not only identifying any conflict or misunderstanding 




between stakeholders, but also examining the influence behind those value judgements held. 
Documentary resources on Project Silvertown were used to gather secondary data on 
stakeholder groups and analysed using the CSH framework to structure the data. The key 
findings in this study revealed the following disjunctions affected the success of the Project 
Silvertown participatory upgrade, namely:   
i) Different stakeholder expectations of community participation and decision-making  
ii) Differing stakeholder visions for project outcomes  
iii) Poor capacitation of community members  
iv) Disjunction of community representation by legitimate community leaders  
v) Disjunctions of UISP policy interpretation  
The use of the CSH framework proved a valuable tool for unfolding the contrasting perspectives 
held by stakeholders in a participatory upgrade. As an evaluative tool CSH also helped to assess 
various project dynamics such as the power and knowledge structures that could negatively 
influence the overall success of a project. Findings of the conflicts between stakeholders in a 
given system can contribute towards identifying what stakeholder assumptions ought to be 
considered and built into planning public infrastructure projects to reduce the likelihood of 
project failures.  
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It is not enough that you should understand about applied science in 
order that your work may increase man’s blessings. Concern for the 
man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest of all 
technical endeavours…in order that the creations of our mind shall be 
a blessing and not a curse to mankind. Never forget this in the midst of 










Community participation is a legislated requirement for all major public infrastructure projects 
in South Africa as it is believed to improve the likelihood of success in major public 
infrastructure projects in South Africa. However, the increasing rate of violent protests by 
citizens voicing their anger and frustration suggests the inability of these participation structure 
to fulfil their desired outcome. Municipalities may feel that they are taking the needs and 
preferences of communities into account during these processes but communities appear to feel 
they are not being taken seriously. 
This study attempted to identify where these discrepancies lie by articulating different 
stakeholder perceptions and expectations in a participatory upgrade project called Project 
Silvertown – better known as the “toilet war saga”. Critical Systems Heuristics was the 
framework used to analyse stakeholder perceptions and expectations in Project Silvertown. The 
data for the investigation was sourced from publically available documentary resources 
obtained from the Western Cape High Court which were used in the court case that ensued. This 
chapter sets out the rationale for the research project, identifies the aim of the study as well as 
the research questions investigated. 
1.1. Rationale 
In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly declared the access to adequate sanitation as 
being “essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights” (Langford, Bartram & Roaf, 
2014). Access to adequate sanitation is also a powerful indicator of the state of human and 
economic development of a nation (South African Human Rights Commission, 2014). It 
bestows many advantages for public health, livelihoods and dignity – advantages which extend 
beyond households to entire communities (United Nations, 2013).  
Globally, the provision of basic sanitation continues to remain a problem for over 2.5 billion 
people across the world (United Nations, 2013). In an attempt to address this need as well as 
other global issues, the United Nations (UN) established the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2000. One of the MDGs targeted halving the population of those living without 
adequate access to water and sanitation by 2015 (Satterthwaite, 2003). By 2015 the goal of 




improving access for 1.25 billion people was not achieved with only a slight improvement to 
2.4 billion people lacking access to adequate sanitation facilities from (Sustainable 
Development Knowledge Platform [SDKP], n.d.). As a post-2015 successor to the MDGs, the 
UN has since developed a list of 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs). Goal 6 of these 17 
SDGs focuses on issues relating to water, sanitation and hygiene, and aims to achieve the 
availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all humans by 2030 (SDKP, 
n.d.). 
The South African government is among the list of 194 countries which have committed 
themselves to achieving the goals set out in the SDGs (SDKP, n.d.). National government has 
aligned the SDGs and timeframes to its National Development Plan (NDP) – a plan aimed at 
eliminating poverty and reducing inequality in the country by 2030 (National Planning 
Commission, 2015).  
One of the key focuses to reduce this inequality and poverty in the NDP is through prioritising 
the upgrading of informal settlements. Since 1994, informal settlements have grown from 300 
to over 2 700 nationwide, and they continue to grow at a rate of between 5% and 7% annually 
(Fieuw, 2015). This poses a major challenge for the government, as these areas have long been 
characterised with service delivery issues such as poor sanitation and waterborne diseases 
(National Planning Commission, 2015). To address these problem areas, the NDP aims to 
provide all citizens with affordable and reliable access to basic sanitation to live healthy and 
dignified lives by 2030 (National Planning Commission, 2015).  
In South Africa, basic sanitation is defined as being a “flush toilet connected to a public 
sewerage system or septic tank or a pit latrine with ventilation pipe” (as quoted in Tissington, 
2011:14). Since 1994, through investment into major public infrastructure projects, the 
government has advanced significantly in addressing the sanitation backlog. The percentage of 
national households without access to basic sanitation went from 52% in 1994 to less than 4% 
in 2017, thus achieving the 2015 MDG for halving the proportion of the population without 
sustainable access to basic sanitation in 2008 (Department of Water Affairs [DWA], 2012, 
2017).  




The success of sustainable sanitation infrastructure projects is dependent on several aspects such 
as financial and economic considerations, environmental considerations, technological and 
operational considerations, health and hygiene considerations, and socio-cultural considerations 
(ICLEI European Secretariat, 2012). Owing to the highly technical nature of a majority of these 
aspects, the provision of sanitation was long considered a domain controlled mostly by 
government, engineers and water services providers. However, more recognition has been given 
towards the value that citizens as end users can contribute towards several of the success factors 
mentioned (Vliet, Spaargaren & Oosterveer, 2011).  
In South Africa, public participation is mandated for stakeholder management of large-scale 
public projects (Department of Human Settlements [DHS], 2009). Residents in informal 
settlement areas are recognised by national government as having deep-rooted knowledge of 
their preferences and development needs (DHS, 2009). Because of this, the incorporation of 
their knowledge is seen as vital to ensuring that service delivery is targeted at satisfying these 
needs and preferences (Fieuw, 2015). The hope is that participation processes will help to 
systematically capture the interests of the public and build their opinions into decision-making 
processes through the project duration for improved likelihood of success (Maharaj, 2012).  
There has been a conscientious effort by the state to promote public participation in service 
delivery to the end that it will establish this shared governance. The Department of Provincial 
and Local Government defines public participation as “an open, accountable process or channel 
through which individuals and groups within selected communities can exchange views and 
influence decision-making” (DPLG, 2005:1).  
In addition to the concept of public participation, government also makes use of the term 
community participation. The distinction made between public participation and community 
participation is the boundary between the grouping of the public and a community. Public 
participation is a blanket term for the participation of an unbounded/undefined group of citizens, 
whereas community participation refers to the participation of residents in a particular ward in 
the context of public participation (Sibeko, 2005). For the purposes of this research the term 
community participation will be used when referring to participatory processes. This is because 




it is the term used in the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme – a central policy 
document in this study that will be discussed in later chapters. 
Major public infrastructure projects, such as sanitation upgrade projects, can be controversial 
and complex spaces requiring navigation through technical and financial constraints as well as 
differing interests of the various stakeholders (such as the public, technical experts, the 
municipality and project funders) involved in the process (Li, Ng & Skitmore, 2013; Quick, 
2014). Furthermore, engaging both experts and everyday stakeholders, such as the public, in 
technically complex decisions can open the door to produce choices that do not adequately 
consider design, safety, equity, efficiency, environmental protection and political feasibility 
(Quick, 2014). An example of the conflicting interests of stakeholders is evident in the 
sanitation study conducted by Armitage, Spiegel and Hilligan (2012) in Barcelona, an informal 
settlement in Cape Town. While the residents of Barcelona preferred a full flush toilet system, 
technical and financial constraints made that preference impossible, as the settlement had been 
built atop a capped solid waste site – which meant that the ground conditions and the danger 
and expense of excavation did not allow for the installation of a conventional sanitation system. 
The expectations of the end users had to be managed and the technical experts were challenged 
to find an alternative solution of which the public would approve and the funders could afford.  
While legislation mandates community participation in infrastructure projects, several 
challenges exist in the practice of shifting projects like upgrading informal settlements from 
being an exclusionary process to participatory upgrades (Fieuw, 2015). Maharaj (2012) argues 
that, despite the efforts made by the government, citizens still feel detached and side-lined as 
stakeholders on state issues incorporating community participation processes on matters 
directly affecting them.  
The South African Public Service Commission conducted an investigation on the Assessment 
of Public Participation Practices in Public Service (2008). One of the challenges raised in the 
investigation was the mistrust between government and the public owing to the lack of 
transparency and accountability due to past experiences (Public Service Commission, 2008). Li 
et al. (2013) attributed one of the reasons for this as being that some government officials were 




cynical about the value community participation brings and were concerned that an overactive 
citizenry could spiral into a situation of conflict and social disorder.  
Because of these concerns government officials may make the choice to fast-track and short-
cut participatory processes – resulting in the community participation exercise being done as a 
formality more than anything else (Li et al., 2013).  
This is seen as problematic because often conflict actually exists due to the divergence of issues 
such as cultures, values, histories or beliefs between the various stakeholders (Li et al, 2013). 
Conversely, findings in the Public Service Commission report also claim that government 
officials believe the public are apathetic when efforts are made to engage with them during 
participatory processes (Public Service Commission, 2008). Quick (2014) explains that 
oftentimes this apathy is as a result of the public feeling as though their involvement does not 
seem to influence decisions – they are invited to participate; yet there is very little that can be 
changed in the policies or projects that have already been put together.  
With participatory processes being fast tracked by government officials or received with apathy 
by the public the possible conflicts in expectations and perceptions that exist among stakeholder 
groups cannot adequately be identified and resolved. Failure to meet or manage the concerns 
and expectations of stakeholders involved in participatory upgrades can jeopardise project 
success (Li et al., 2013; Fieuw, 2015). An example of this in the South African sanitation sector 
would be the 2011 violent protests of Project Silvertown.  
In the run up to the 2011 local government elections, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) received two complaints about municipalities, which built some 2 000 
toilets without enclosures in their local communities (DWA 2012). The first complaint at the 
end of 2009 from the Western Cape Makhaza informal settlement in Khayelitsha was against 
the City of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality. The second complaint concerned 
Rammulotsi in the Free State against the Moqhaka local municipality.  
Following the SAHRC’s investigations into these matters and a ruling by the Constitutional 
Court, it was found (among other findings) that both municipalities had violated the residents’ 
right to participation. The SAHRC recommended that both local municipalities had to 




immediately enclose these toilets in a manner that upheld human rights (SAHRC, 2014). Project 
Silvertown provides the case for this study and the documents associated with the High Court 
Judgement provide the data analysed. 
1.2. Problem statement 
Community participation processes have been legislated in public infrastructure projects. There 
is a belief that they are needed in order to successfully address the crises of poor service delivery 
– particularly in informal settlement areas. However, research is showing that challenges exist 
in the practice of incorporating community participation processes in projects of this nature. 
Some reasons these challenges exist are due to the shortcutting of participatory processes by 
government officials as well as apathy from the public to engage in participatory processes. 
This poses a problem as it undermines the ability to understand the conflicts in stakeholder 
views and incorporate the knowledge of the public into participatory upgrades. 
1.3. Research aim 
This research project aimed to articulate the perceptions and expectations that stakeholders have 
in sanitation infrastructure projects with a view to understanding the implications this has 
towards the success of participatory upgrades. This is intended to inform improved participatory 
processes. 
1.4. Research questions 
The following research questions were asked: 
• What are the disjunctures in perceptions and expectations between stakeholders in 
participatory upgrades? 
• What implications do the different perceptions and expectations of various stakeholders 








Supporting these questions is the following sub-question: 
• What contribution does Critical Systems Heuristics make as a framework towards 
surfacing the differences in perceptions and expectations held by stakeholders in a 
participatory upgrade? 
1.5. Research methodology 
Project Silvertown was used as the case study for this study. This project began in 2007 with 
the purpose being to upgrade an informal settlement called Silvertown in Khayelitsha, a 
township in the Western Cape Province (Ntliziywana & Ayele, 2010). Under the management 
of the City of Cape Town, the project was upgraded in terms of the Upgrading of Informal 
Settlements Programme (UISP). It included the provision of interim services, full engineering 
infrastructure and housing for 1 316 households (Western Cape High Court, 2011a).  
During the project the City erected unenclosed toilets claiming they had an agreement with the 
community that the residents would be responsible for building their own enclosures (Western 
Cape High Court, 2011a). This led to public outcry, protest action, an investigation by the South 
African Human Rights Commission and a court case (Ntliziywana & Ayele, 2010). 
Furthermore, there was extensive media coverage on this case, which spurred national 
government to review the national policy on sanitation (Tissington, 2011).   
This case study was selected due to the important role it had played towards re-evaluating the 
state and provision of sanitation services in South Africa and the extensive data readily available 
on the case.  
To analyse the perceptions and expectations of stakeholders, a systems thinking-based 
framework called Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH) was used. The CSH framework makes use 
of 12 boundary questions that are asked in two modes, namely the ideal/what ought to be mode 
and the actual/what is mode. The main modifications to the standard application of CSH in this 
study were through the source used to answer the 12 boundary questions and the answering of 
the questions in each mode.  




Usually, CSH is applied to human participants who answer the 12 questions in both the ideal 
and actual modes. For this research, a textual analysis of documents such as policy documents, 
affidavits, project documents and newspaper clippings were used to develop answers to the 12 
questions posed. CSH also prescribes that stakeholders answer the 12 questions in both the ideal 
and the actual mode.  
This study modified the prescription and based the ideal scenario on the policy and project 
documentation on which Project Silvertown was based. To answer questions in the actual mode, 
textual data from stakeholders involved in Project Silvertown was used. Because the answers 
constructed were based on the analysis of textual data, the critique to the modification would 
be the biases of the researcher with regard to answering the questions. To minimise this bias, 
data from multiple sources was used and rigorously analysed. Furthermore, in the explanation 
of the answers constructed, extensive quoting of excerpts of the data was included for the reader 
to identify the direct opinions that were interpreted to construct the answers. 
1.6. Outline of the study 
This chapter has provided a background to the problem, and presented an overview of the 
research project and design.  
The Project Silvertown case study is presented in detail in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 3 then follows with an investigation on the legislation and policy of community 
participation in sanitation projects as well as informal settlement upgrades.  
Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology and presents Critical Systems Heuristics (CSH), 
a framework developed by Werner Ulrich in 1983, which has been adopted for this research 
project. The chapter also explains the modifications made to CSH to better suit the nature of 
this study. As described previously, the main modification to the standard application of CSH 
in this study has been done through the use of documentary data being used, as opposed to data 
being obtained from interviews with human participants. This study also modified the CSH 
framework by basing the is/ought scenario on the policy and project documentation on which 
Project Silvertown has been implemented. Answers to questions in the actual mode were taken 
from textual data of stakeholders involved in Project Silvertown. This chapter also discusses 




the limitations and possible bias the modification to the framework could have on the 
interpretation of the analysis. Furthermore, it highlights actions taken by the researcher to 
mitigate bias in the interpretation of results. 
Chapter 5 presents an analysis of the various stakeholders involved in Project Silvertown as 
well as the analysis of stakeholder perceptions and expectations using the modified CSH 
framework.  
Chapter 6 is the discussion chapter and reflects on the key findings from the data analysed in 
response to the research questions and sub-question posed at the start of the project.  
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the research project and includes limitations of the 
research as well as recommendations for future studies. 
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2. Project Silvertown  
This chapter discusses the events of the case study selected for the research project, Project 
Silvertown. Public attention to Project Silvertown began shortly after 21 January 2010. Local 
members of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) lodged a complaint with 
the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) against the City of Cape Town (CoCT) 
for building 1 316 unenclosed toilets (SAHRC 2010; Tempelhoff 2012). 
Project Silvertown dated back to 2003 when the City of Cape Town submitted an application to 
the Province of the Western Cape for the upgrading of Silvertown, an informal settlement in the 
Khayelitsha township. The project was initially proposed to be an in-situ development upgrade. 
In-situ upgrades involve the upgrading of informal settlements as they stand with the aim being 
to relocate as few residents as possible (DHS, 2009). Unlike roll-over upgrades and new 
township developments that involve the relocation of residents as well as the ability for 
structured town and special planning, in-situ upgrades aim to minimise relocation and require 
road, sanitation and other municipal infrastructure to be designed to fit into the shape of the 
existing settlement (Western Cape Department of Housing, 2005). As Silvertown (SST) was an 
already existing informal settlement area of approximately 2 000 inhabitants, the CoCT made 
the decision to upgrade the site in terms of the UISP (City of Cape Town, 2003; Western Cape 
High Court, 2011a).  
Although initially viewed to be an in-situ upgrade, during preliminary feasibility studies it was 
found that the SST area was too small to accommodate all of the 1 316 households required 
(Western Cape High Court, 2011a). To address this problem two nearby greenfield sites in 
Makhaza and Town 2 were selected for use with plans to relocate some of the 1 316 SST 
householders to these sites. Therefore, all three sites formed part of the project scope and were 
included in the initial Project Silvertown application for funding under the UISP (Forensic 
Services Department, 2010).  
As shown in Figure 1, a total of 121 erven were to be relocated to Town 2, 298 erven to the site 
in Makhaza and 897 erven were planned for the original in-situ site in Silvertown (Forensic 
Services Department, 2010).  





Figure 1: Major sections of Khayelitsha with Project Silvertown sites (Adapted from Wilson, 
2014) 
Originally, the City of Cape Town put in a tender for the provision of interim services, full 
engineering infrastructure and relocation assistance. Project Silvertown was to be implemented 
in four stages, as recommended by the UISP. These four phases will be discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 3. However, it is important to note that Phase 4, which involved the provision 
of houses, was to be implemented at a later stage. Therefore, the application submitted by the 
City to the Province of the Western Cape in October 2004 was for the completion of the first 
three phases.  
Construction of the communal toilets began in 2007 with the plan to construct 179 communal 
toilets in SST, 59 in Makhaza and 25 in Town 2 (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). The 
communal toilets consisted of an enclosed concrete structure, housing concrete slabs upon 
which toilets were built and plumbing connected (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). 
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Construction started on the two greenfield sites, Makhaza and Town 2 with all communal toilets 
being built as well as six extra communal toilets.  
When in-situ construction began in SST only 63 of the planned 179 communal toilets were built 
until the community halted construction (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). Members of the 
community were unhappy as they were not in favour of communal toilets and felt they had not 
been informed of the decision to construct them (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). They 
demanded that each of the 1 316 erven be provided with an individual toilet.  
In an attempt to reach an agreement with the residents, in November 2007 the City held a 
community meeting in an open field. No attendance register was taken; however, officials from 
the City stated that members from the community, community leaders, ward councillors and 
City officials were present at this meeting.  
The City proposed to the attendees that they would be able to provide toilets for each erf; 
however, residents would have to enclose these toilets by themselves. This was owing to budget 
constraints, as the available funding they had would not allow for the installation and enclosure 
of the 1 316 toilets required.  
An informal agreement was reached between all parties present on this matter and construction 
of the 1 316 unenclosed toilets began in May 2009 and was completed in December of the same 
year (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). These open toilets were constructed in such a way that 
they were in full view of community members on a concrete plinth with the cistern and pipe 
connections not attached to any walls.   
In an attempt to provide proof of a formal agreement between the City and residents, as per the 
UISP, the CoCT requested that, upon completion of each installation, the residents sign what 
was termed as “happy letters”. These letters served to indicate the residents’ approval of the 
toilets installed and their obligation to provide their own enclosures. Of the 1 316 happy letters 
signed, only one was negative (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). 
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Upon completing the construction of the individual toilets, some of the residents then began to 
enclose the toilets themselves. Of the 1 316 open toilets installed, the residents enclosed all but 
55 open toilets in Makhaza (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). After roughly three months of 
the installation of the open toilets, disgruntled rumblings began to resurface in the community. 
For many residents, they believed that the open toilets and makeshift enclosures which they had 
constructed themselves would be a temporary measure. When they signed the “happy letters” 
they believed they were agreeing to open toilets being temporarily built for incorporation into 
a government-funded house three months later.  
When it seemed like this was not likely to happen, community leaders in the area, primarily the 
African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), began to engage with the community 
(Western Cape High Court, 2011a). The ANCYL is the youth wing of the African National 
Congress, the ruling political party in South Africa since 1994. The Democratic Alliance (DA), 
the ruling party in the City of Cape Town and greater Western Province, is the official 
Figure 2: Woman standing next to open-air toilet in plain sight of all passers-by. Khayelitsha, 
Cape Town (Honwana, 2010) 
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opposition party to the African National Congress (Tempelhoff, 2012). On 21 January 2010, 
the ANCYL lodged a complaint regarding the case of the 55 households forced to make use of 
the unenclosed toilets to the SAHRC (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). The complaint filed 
was on the basis of a violation of human rights of the residents by the CoCT’s decision to build 
unenclosed toilets in a predominantly black, low socioeconomic area (Western Cape High 
Court, 2011a).  
During the SAHRC’s investigation, the media investigated the complaint lodged, and the 
situation gained both local and international coverage. In his paper, Tempelhoff (2012) believed 
the large interest this story received was because, to the country and world at large, the open 
toilets raised a sombre message of  
the callous disregard, in some quarters of South African society, for the plight of less 
privileged people on the fringes of the country’s urban conurbations. An everyday 
necessity like a toilet – associated with a sanitary domestic lifestyle – became a conduit 
in the public eye for comprehending just how important it was to respect an individual’s 
privacy (Tempelhoff, 2012:83).  
Prior to the ruling by the SAHRC, the City of Cape Town made three documented attempts to 
enclose the 55 unenclosed toilets with a structure built from corrugated galvanised iron and 
timber (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). In the first attempt, the building contractors, 
Shamrock Plumbing, were stopped by unknown members of the community who demanded 
brick and mortar enclosures be built as opposed to the timber and corrugated iron structures 
(Forensic Services Department, 2010). Following this event, a Ward Councillor conducted a 
meeting with the community to try and reach an agreement for the City’s contractors to 
recommence with enclosing the toilets. However, the meeting was unsuccessful with no 
agreement being made.  
Despite no agreement being reached, the City again requested their contractors to enclose the 
toilets in March 2010. This time the City’s contactors were able to enclose 26 of the toilets 
before community members halted construction and demolished all of the newly built 
enclosures (Western Cape High Court, 2011a).  





Figure 3: Dismantling the zinc toilet covers (Honwana, 2010) 
What initiated the City’s third attempt to enclose the toilets prior to the findings from the 
SAHRC was the stabbing of Mrs Ntombenhle Beja, a 76-year-old resident of Makhaza. In April 
2010, Mrs Beja made use of her open toilet in the evening to relieve herself using blankets to 
cover herself for privacy (SAHRC, 2010). When she had finished and was walking back to her 
home, she was attacked and stabbed by an assailant who demanded she give him her cellphone.  
In an attempt to remedy the safety concerns this incident had raised, the mayor of Cape Town, 
Mr Dan Plato, met with members of the ANCYL, the Makhaza Councillor and several CoCT 
housing officials (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). The meeting was considered successful 
with an agreement reached by all parties present that the City could once again commence with 
the installation of the corrugated iron and timber toilet enclosures. However, when construction 
resumed again on 24 May 2010, community members vandalised and demolished the enclosures 
again and forced the building contractors to vacate (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). In 
response to this, the mayor then ordered the removal of all 55 unenclosed toilets as well as 10 
other toilets with enclosures (SAHRC, 2010).  
The SAHRC released the findings to their investigation on 4 June 2010. The results of the 
investigation found that the City failed to adequately consult the community throughout the 
   16 
 
 
process (SAHRC, 2010). The findings also stated that the CoCT violated the residents’ 
constitutional right to dignity by providing unenclosed toilets (SAHRC, 2010). 
Recommendations made by the SAHRC were for the City to reinstall and adequately enclose 
51 of the removed toilets with a brick and mortar structure (Tempelhoff, 2012).  
The City appealed the SAHRC’s findings in July 2010 but the appeal was dismissed on 21 
September of that year (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). On 23 September 2010 Messers 
Andile Lili and Andiswa Ncani, ANCYL leaders and residents of Makhaza, submitted an 
application against the City of Cape Town together with Mrs Beja (Western Cape High Court, 
2011a). The case was handed over to Judge Nathan Erasmus who, after conducting a site visit 
to Makhaza, filed a court order for the interim relief of the Makhaza community members. 
Judge Erasmus ordered that the City reinstall all toilets previously removed and temporarily 
enclose all of the 1 316 toilets using a corrugated iron and timber structure not exceeding a cost 
of R2 800 (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). In addition to this, he instructed the City to hand-
deliver written notices to all residents requesting their permission to install such toilet structures. 
The City was also instructed to consider any alternative plans raised by the community to better 
suit their contextual environment (Western Cape High Court, 2011a). In December, the City 
attempted to comply with this ruling but were allegedly restricted from doing so by ANCYL 
members.  
The court hearing occurred in March 2011 at the Cape Town High Court, hearing arguments 
compiled by the legal teams of both the Western Cape and CoCT as well as the legal 
representatives of the three applicants, Andile Lili, Andiswa Ncani and Ntombenhla Beja. The 
main argument presented by the Western Cape and CoCT was that, although the decision to 
build unenclosed toilets for Project Silvertown was unconventional, it was not unconstitutional 
(Tempelhoff, 2012). Arguments made by the residents’ legal team were that the installation of 
open toilets was “an infringement of the rights, dignity, privacy and freedom of residents to 
endure the unacceptable conditions of having to use open toilets” (Tempelhoff, 2012:85). The 
final judgment handed down in 2011 found the City of Cape Town in violation of meeting the 
residents’ right to human dignity and ordered that the unenclosed toilets be walled by a structure 
making use of brick and mortar (Tempelhoff, 2012). 
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3. Legislative and policy framework on sanitation in 
South Africa 
This chapter investigates the legislation and policy on community participation in sanitation 
projects as well as participatory informal settlement upgrades. Particular attention is given to 
the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme the programme that Project Silvertown was 
administered in terms of.  
3.1 Introduction 
In 1994, the newly elected government was faced with many challenges to redress the inequities 
brought about as a result of the apartheid regime. One such challenge was access to basic 
sanitation, which over 50% of the then 40 million citizens lacked (DWA, 2012). With the 
addition of rapid urbanisation occurring in South Africa, informal settlement areas in particular 
have faced major challenges in providing adequate sanitation services to an increasing number 
of poor households (Mjoli, 2010). The South African government became party to the 
conventions set out by the MDGs as well as several other declarations such as the Vancouver 
Declaration on Human Settlements (1976) and the Habitat Agenda (1996) aimed at the 
development of informal settlements (Department of Human Settlements [DHS], 2009). 
National legislation and policy on sanitation was developed to be consistent with the 
international conventions mentioned. From a constitutional point of view, legislation places the 
responsibility to provide adequate service delivery on the government. Several sections within 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) make direct and indirect connections to 
issues relating to sanitation provision and service delivery.  
The first of these is Section 1(a), which stresses that human dignity and the advancement 
towards equality for all in South Africa should be what all human rights are to be founded upon 
(Western Cape High Court, 2011a). Another section in the Constitution often interpreted as 
pertaining to sanitation issues is Section 24(a), which states that everyone has the right to live 
in an environment that is not harmful to their state of wellbeing or health (Mjoli, 2010). There 
are several other sections in the Constitution which highlight issues such as an individual’s right 
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to privacy and human dignity, all of which speak to the softer issues involving sanitation 
provision.  
There are several policy documents explicitly relating to sanitation, which are also pertinent to 
the Project Silvertown case study. Those of which were passed before the start of Project 
Silvertown and were most pertinent to the case were as follows: 
The Water Services Act 108 of 1997 established the overall compulsory national standards for 
basic sanitation (Acts Online, 2013). For the minimum standard for basic sanitation, the Act 
stipulates that the government make provision for “a toilet which is safe, reliable, 
environmentally sound, easy to clean, provides privacy and protection against the weather, well 
ventilated, keeps smells to a minimum and prevents the entry and exit of flies and other disease-
carrying pests” (Acts Online, 2013).  
The National Sanitation Policy (1996) was developed mainly to clarify issues raised in the 
White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation of 1994. This paper was largely reworked into the 
2001 White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation, which is mentioned later in this document. 
The National Sanitation Policy lists several types of sanitation systems commonly used in South 
Africa (Tissington, 2011). One such system mentioned is the bucket system, which was being 
used in the Silvertown area prior to the upgrade project being approved (Western Cape High 
Court, 2011a). The policy describes the bucket toilet as a portable dry sanitation device 
consisting of a seat placed on top of a bucket for collection of excreta (Department of Water 
and Forestry Former [DWAF], 1996). The policy states that besides not meeting the minimum 
standards of sanitation, bucket toilets are considered socially unacceptable and that the use of 
these be eradicated (Tissington, 2011). Project Silvertown aimed to replace this system with the 
provision of full water-borne sewerage or flush toilets.  
The Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 was created as a guideline to assist municipalities in the 
social and economic development of their communities (Marata 2012). Section 4(2)(d) of this 
Act states that municipalities should “strive to ensure that municipal services are provided to 
the local community in a financially and environmentally sustainable manner” (Tissington, 
2011). It also outlines procedures and processes, which municipalities can use to encourage and 
engage communities to participate in their development (Tissington, 2011).  
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The 2001 White Paper on Basic Household Sanitation (developed as an update from the White 
Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 1994) adopted a framework particularly aimed 
at the provision of sustainable sanitation for low density rural areas as well as informal 
settlements (Marata, 2012). The Paper introduced 12 policy principles around the provision of 
sustainable sanitation for households. While all of these principles are applicable to all 
sanitation infrastructure projects, in the context of Project Silvertown four principles spoke to 
some of the key problems that were faced in the project. These principles were community 
participation in decision-making processes, the provision of sanitation as a human right, the 
financial sustainability of sanitation initiatives, as well as the cooperative governance approach 
between national, provincial and local government (Tissington, 2011). 
The Housing Act 107 of 1997 was written to serve as the primary piece of housing legislation 
in South Africa (Tissington, 2011). This document established a framework for sustainable 
housing development in the country and defined housing development as follows: 
The establishment and maintenance of habitable, stable and sustainable public and 
private residential environments to ensure viable households and communities in 
areas allowing convenient access to economic opportunities, and to health, 
educational and social amenities in which all citizens and permanent residents of the 
Republic will, on a progressive basis, have access to- 
(a) permanent residential structures with secure tenure, ensuring internal and external 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; and 
(b) potable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy supply (Western 
Cape High Court, 2011a, 23:51). 
 
As evidenced in the abovementioned quote, the provision of infrastructure that ensures privacy 
and protection against the elements should be a key feature of infrastructure provided as per the 
Housing Act. This includes the provision of sanitation infrastructure. The Housing Act was 
amended in 2001, following the release of the National Housing Code in 2000 (Tissington, 
2011). The National Housing Code introduced guidelines and principles for various national 
housing programmes to which all spheres of government are to adhere. Amendments to the Act 
included a list of various national housing programmes, which, depending on the context of the 
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development required, municipalities can seek to adhere to planned infrastructure development 
within their region (Tissington, 2011). 
The Project Silvertown case study hones in on one such national housing programme, namely 
the Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme (UISP).  
3.2 The Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme 
The UISP was instituted in terms of section 3(4)(g) of the Housing Act and developed in 
response to the rapid urbanisation rate in informal settlement areas (Tissington, 2011). This 
programme was particularly targeted at in-situ development upgrades with the aim being to 
relocate as few residents as possible while providing the residents with formalised municipal 
services. The UISP suggests that municipalities adopt a 4-phase approach to upgrading informal 
settlements (Department of Human Settlements [DHS] 2009). The four UISP phases and 
associated activities are shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 5: UISP Project Phases (DHS, 2009) 
•Municipalities submit interim business plan to provincial 
government for funding
•Phase focuses on community participation
PHASE 1
Application
•Municipalities recieve funding for the following activities:
• Land aquisition; community participation agreement; 
installation of interim services; geotechnical 
investigations and environmental impact assessments
PHASE 2
Project Iniitiation
•Municipality submits final business plan to MEC. Upon 
approval, funding is given for the following activities:
•Project management; housing support services; planning 
processes; formalisation of land occupational rights; 
relocation assistance; land rehabilitation; installation of 
permanent municipal engineering infrastructure; 





•Implemented in terms of a relevant national housing 
subsidy programme; activities include:
•Housing construction; erven ownership registration; 
completing construction of outstanding social amenities
PHASE 4
Housing Consolidation
Figure 4: UISP Project Phases (DHS, 2009) 
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Phase 1 of the UISP requires for the developer, usually a municipality, to apply for funding and 
submit an interim business plan to the relevant provincial department of human settlements 
(DHS, 2009). Phase 1 also places emphasis on community participation to ensure the 
community remains involved through all phases of the upgrading project (Van der Westhuizen, 
2017).  
Phase 2 is the project initiation phase and is usually undertaken over a period of eight to 12 
months. Once approval has been granted for the upgrading project municipalities are given 
funding for the following activities: 
• Land acquisition (if required) 
• Conclusion of agreement between the municipality and the community which will regulate 
the terms of community participation for the project 
• Undertaking a socio-economic and demographic profile of the settlement 
• Provision of interim services such as basic water and sanitation services to households 
pending the formalisation of the settlement 
• Detailed investigations on the geotechnical conditions as well as an environmental impact 
assessment required for the planning process 
Phase 3 is the project implementation phase. This phase requires that the municipality 
undertaking the upgrade submit a final business plan for the MEC to consider and approve (Van 
der Westhuizen, 2017). Upon approval from the MEC, the municipality will receive funding to 
conduct the following activities: 
• Establish project management capacity 
• Establish housing support services 
• Initiate the project planning process 
• Formalise land occupational rights and resolve disputes 
• Provide relocation assistance and perform land rehabilitation 
• Install formal municipal engineering infrastructure and services 
• Construct community facilities and socio-economic amenities 
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Phase 4 is the housing consolidation phase and consists of township establishment finalisation, 
ownership registration and the construction of housing or other top structures (Van der 
Westhuizen, 2017). While this phase forms part of the UISP, it is implemented under the 
provisions of the relevant national housing programme (DHS, 2009). Funding approval for 
Phase 4 is handled at the individual household level and is dependent on whether households 
meet certain criteria to qualify them for housing subsidies (DHS, 2009). It requires households 
to apply for a housing subsidy under various housing subsidy programmes (Van der 
Westhuizen, 2017). Several housing subsidy programmes such as the people’s housing projects, 
individual ownership options and contractor-built houses are available for qualifying residents 
to choose from (DHS, 2009). What is important to note is that the funding arrangements for 
Phase 4 are different from the first three phases (Van der Westhuizen, 2017). 
The CoCT adopted this phased approach for Project Silvertown. Phase 1 and 2 formed the 
application and initiation phases of the project, and Phase 3 was seen as the project 
implementation phase (CoCT, 2004:2).  
• Phase 1 comprised the pre-feasibility study, which aimed to identify details such as the 
project location, land ownership, geotechnical scoping studies, households affected, as well 
as a preliminary work plan and budget (CoCT, 2004:4).  
• Phase 2 was made up of various activities such as a survey and registration of all households, 
the provision of interim services, an environmental impact assessment, community 
participation processes and a work plan for the scope of works, as well as the estimated 
budget for the scope of works (CoCT, 2003). For Project Silvertown, it is unclear whether 
the funding provided for the interim services was for individual or communal toilets; 
however, it was decided that communal toilets with a ratio of one toilet for every five 
households would be provided for residents (Western Cape High Court, 2011a).   
• Phase 3 was the implementation phase and involved detailed design, construction site work, 
as well as the relocation of residents to Town 2 and Makhaza. Upon the completion of Phase 
3, the City envisaged that residents would have been relocated to areas with access to interim 
services and full engineering infrastructure. Interim services typically refer to providing 
residents with access to a rudimentary water supply such as a stand pipe, temporary 
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sanitation services such as communal or chemical toilets, as well as refuse removal services 
(Western Cape High Court, 2011a).  
• Phase 4 was the top structure phase of the project and involved the construction of 
residential housing per erf.  
3.3 While the long-term plan for the City was to complete all four project 
phases, the decision was taken to initially seek approval only for phases 
1-3. Phase 4, which dealt with the construction of houses, was to be 
handled at a later stage and under a different budget application. 
Therefore, although residents were under the impression that they 
were to receive housing within three months of the installation of their 
open toilets, this would not have been possible, as no funding had been 
applied for or sourced for this phase of the project.UISP funding 
structure 
The DHS, through the Integrated Housing and Human Settlement Redevelopment Grant, 
manages funding for all national UISP projects (DHS, 2009). Annually, national government 
allocates bulk funding to each provincial department. The onus is on provincial government to 
distribute the funds received based on the number of UISP projects planned within their area of 
governance. Municipalities submit project-specific proposals, outlining the required amount of 
funding they need for the project, depending on the various considerations, including service 
standards and the development options selected for the upgrade.  
If provincial government approves the project, funding for the completion of phases 1-3 is given 
to local government. As previously mentioned, funding approval for Phase 4 is handled at the 
individual household level and is dependent on whether households meet certain criteria to 
qualify them for housing subsidies. An agreement is then required to be made between the 
municipality and the provincial government as to how the control of the funds will take place.  
In October 2004, the Province of the Western Cape received a request for project approval and 
funding to the value of R33 748 194 from the City for phases 1-3 of Project Silvertown.  
In July of 2005, Project Silvertown was approved by the Province of the Western Cape and 
funding was made available to the City of Cape Town. The UISP stipulates that, upon project 
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approval, a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) must be entered into between the 
provincial department and the municipality (DHS, 2009). This agreement was signed between 
the CoCT and the Province of the Western Cape, and stipulated that Project Silvertown was to 
adhere to regulations as set out under part 3 of the National Housing Code, which deals with 
the UISP. Details mentioned in the MOU included scheduled project milestones, project 
budgeting and cash flows, detailed technical descriptions of services to be provided, etc. (DHS, 
2009). Another key aspect which the National Housing Code emphasises is that municipalities 
have to adhere to the facilitation of public participation processes throughout the duration of the 
project. 
3.4 Community participation in sanitation projects 
The report on the status of sanitation services in South Africa highlights key issues affecting 
the efficient provision of sanitation services. One of the main concerns was inadequate 
involvement of communities in planning and implementation, thus leading to low community 
acceptance of sanitation infrastructure (DWA, 2012). In October 2012, the Multi-Level 
Government Initiative released findings on the state of public protest activity in the country, 
revealing an increasing trend in violent public protests between 2007 and 2012. Among the list 
of the top five grievances cited were protests on the state and service delivery of water and 
sanitation (Powell & De Visser, 2012).  
This situation points to an obvious disjuncture between what is intended in policy and what is 
experienced by citizens, with several calls being made to civil society and the monitoring and 
evaluation sector to share their expertise with government to improve the situation (Naidoo, 
2011). The Public Service Commission found that municipalities faced several challenges, 
particularly with regard to participatory processes and service delivery (Public Service 
Commission , 2008).  
The DWA (2012) also raised points that financial, time and human resource constraints were 
some of the challenges that resulted in municipalities not being able to engage communities in 
a meaningful manner; they were often under pressure to meet sanitation delivery targets and 
this led to poor community ownership of new sanitation infrastructure (DWA 2012; Public 
Service Commission, 2008).  
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While mistrust between the government and communities has played a role in the failings of 
participatory processes, Mjoli (2010) acknowledges that there have been examples of South 
African case studies of successful community participation in sanitation projects where 
communities played a leading role in the implementation of sanitation projects. An example of 
one such project was documented by Ngobeni (2015) who conducted a comparative 
investigation into the effect different community participation methods in sanitation 
infrastructure projects had on user adoption and sustainable sanitation in Bushbuckridge. 
Findings revealed that the village, which made effective use of community participation 
methods by involving the community in decision-making processes, significantly improved 
project success and longevity of sanitation infrastructure.  
These case studies showed that communities were willing to collaborate with government for 
the improvement of their sanitation facilities, provided they were recognised as equal partners 
in the development process (Mjoli, 2010).  
While community participation remains a buzzword in development and governance practice, 
Rowe, Horlick-jones, Walls and Pidgeon (2005) assert that there is little empirical data to 
support positive effects of community participation processes. Rowe et al. (2005) conclude that 
globally commitment to community participation is lacking because of power imbalances. This 
results in community participation becoming a means for government to legitimate itself within 
a community through intentionally giving them a false sense of participation. In such cases, 
community participation is often used to maintain the status quo.  
Ziblim (2013) reported similar findings for the incorporation of community participation 
processes in UISP projects. In his study, he found that while the programme mandated 
community participation, municipalities often conducted these processes after experts had 
already devised upgrading plans and designs. This left little room for residents to influence 
decisions made through these participation processes (Ziblim, 2013). 
In her research, Maharaj (2012) found that stakeholder groups did not share a common 
understanding of community participation, which had resulted in relations between stakeholders 
(state officials and community leaders) often being strained. Municipal managers and service 
providers perceived community participation as consultation, while community leaders 
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perceived it as a partnership (Maharaj, 2012). Consequently, community leaders felt 
undermined by community participation processes, while state officials felt that they were 
making adequate progress in implementing community participation as they understood it.  
Community participation cannot act as a transformative force to change local governance if 
power imbalances and a non-unified understanding of participation exist between experts and 
communities (Parkinson, 2009). 
In the case of the UISP, the contextual knowledge contributions community members can make 
have been recognised as valuable towards ensuring the sustainability of upgraded settlements 
(DHS, 2009). To ensure this knowledge is harnessed appropriately, the UISP suggests that 
existing social networks in the area and structures such as ward committees play an active part 
in community participation processes (DSH, 2009). These structures should be used not only to 
facilitate participation processes, but also for capacity-building initiatives to ensure that 
residents feel competent enough to participate actively. Funding of up to 3% of the project cost 
is made available for all community participation related processes under the UISP, and requires 
that a structured agreement be made between the community and the municipality (DHS, 2009).  
For Project Silvertown, community participation processes occurred as early as 2003 when the 
City established a Project Steering Committee. The committee consisted of representatives from 
the City, ward councillors from the affected areas as well as community representatives. In the 
selection of community representatives, the City approached two existing community structures 
within the area, namely the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the 
Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). Furthermore, the City appointed a community liaison 
consultant residing in Khayelitsha to assist them in public participation processes and planning.  
3.5 Community participation conceptual frameworks 
In his thesis Abbott (1993) investigated the theoretical development of community 
participation, particularly three different conceptual frameworks of community participation. 
He defines conceptual frameworks for community participation as a “framework within which 
the various components of community participation can be linked to each other” (Abbott, 
1993:68).  
   27 
 
 
The earliest framework identified by Abbott is that of Arnstein (1969) who developed a 
framework describing eight levels of citizen participation that she termed as a ladder of citizen 
participation (Abbott, 1993). Arnstein’s framework related the notion of community 
participation to the idea of community power – the ability for community members to join in 
determining decisions relating to their development so they are able to “induce significant social 
reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society (Arnstein, 1969:216).  
Each of the eight rungs on the ladder describe a different intensity of involvement by the 
beneficiary group ranging from levels of nonparticipation, varying degrees of tokenism to the 
highest rungs of the ladder describing the degrees of citizen power (Arnstein, 1969). Abbott 
highlights two significant contributions from Arnstein’s paper. The first is the connection made 
between levels of community participation being linked to the amount of power given to 
communities in decision making processes (Abbott, 1993). The second contribution is the 
ladder of citizen participation itself in that it provides a structure outlining the “continuum of 
increasing intensity which tends towards some form of control” (Abbott, 1993:55).  
While able to identify a continuum of intensities that can exist in community participation 
processes, one criticism made was that applications of her framework might be limited to 
projects relating to the urban poor in America and not suitable within the context of developing 
nations such as South Africa (Abbott, 1993).  
The second framework Abbott discusses is that of Paul and was the first research paper that 
specifically focused on community participation from a developing nation’s point of view 
(Abbott, 1993). Paul’s framework is a three dimensional model that expands on Arnstein’s 
continuum of intensity levels of participation to include two additional components, namely 
community participation objectives and instruments (Abbott, 1993). Paul identifies five main 
objectives and outcomes for community participation namely: 
i) The empowerment of community members 
ii) Capacity building of beneficiaries to strengthen their ability to contribute towards the 
project development through the provision of relevant skills and knowledge  
iii) Effectiveness relating to the degree in which the project outcomes are congruent with 
community needs and wants 
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iv) Cost sharing between project implementers and beneficiaries for an increased sense of 
ownership of the project and its related services 
v) Efficiency in the delivery of community participation to ensure the best use of financial, 
human and other resources required for the process (Abbott, 1993; Paul, 1987) 
In addition to objectives, Paul (1987) identifies a component of participation he termed as 
“instruments of community participation”. These are institutional devices used to organise a 
community participation in a project and fall under three categories, namely:  
i) Field workers of the implementing agency who are seen as the group used to interact 
and organize with the beneficiary group 
ii) Community workers/committees who act as community mobilisers and are usually 
selected by the beneficiaries through means of a consensus or consultative process.  
iii) User groups that, where possible, are specialized and organized groups within the 
beneficiary group. While this group has the potential to ensure the highest levels of 
community participation are reached in projects, they are often the most complex 
instruments to sustain. User groups are able to coexist with the aforementioned 
community worker/committee instruments (Paul, 1987). 
Abbott recognises Paul’s framework as a significant contribution to the community 
participation debate by distinguishing between community participation objectives and 
intensities and identifying instruments (Abbott, 1993). At the same time he notes that Paul’s 
framework does not state how and who ought to decide the level of intensity and objectives for 
the given project.  
The third framework investigated is referred to by Abbott at the “objectives” conceptual 
framework developed by Moser for projects in the developing world. Moser expands on the list 
of objectives Paul identified and, similar to Arnstein, places community participation objectives 
on a continuum (Abbott, 1993). However, unlike Arnstein’s work this framework assigns only 
one level of intensity to community participation processes – a level of complete control 
(Abbott, 1993). Therefore this framework takes on the view that community participation 
processes can either be viewed as a “means” or an “end” to community empowerment (Moser, 
1983). Processes which are in support of the complete control of the community are seen to be 
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the end component of the framework. Those processes which do not support the empowerment 
of the community fall under the “means” component of the framework (Abbott, 1993). This 
“means and end” duality is seen as problematic to Abbot because it places “community control 
and power within the socio-political sphere” at the neglect of the technical, and economic issues 
(Abbott, 1993:76). 
In Abbott’s critique of the conceptual frameworks on community participation mentioned, there 
are two fundamental issues both of the frameworks share. The first issue centres on the entry 
point of the community into the decision making process. The second issue is around the 
relationship shared between the different stakeholders involved in the participation process. 
Goulet (1986) clarifies the stakeholder relationships in a development process by using the 
concept of perceptions. He argues that three types of role-players make developmental 
decisions: technical specialists, politicians and persons expressing general or special concern. 
Technical specialists and politicians approach decision making on distinct rationality systems 
such as technological rationality systems that are based on scientific evidence or political 
rationality systems based on the preservation of power. Those parties with general or specific 
concern pursue an ethical rationality that pursues the promotion of ethical values above all 
rationality systems. It is when these different role-players with different rationality systems 
“converge in decision making arenas, the three rationalities impinge upon one another, not in 
the mode of horizontal mutuality, but across purposes and in a vertical pattern” (Goulet, 
1986:304-305). 
3.6 Summary 
Literature relating to sanitation service provision, upgrading of informal settlements and the 
community participation processes incorporated in these infrastructure projects in South Africa 
was explored. The chapter began by exploring the legislative framework on sanitation service 
delivery in South Africa, highlighting key policies relating to the provision of sanitation 
infrastructure. The review then went on to focus on the provision of sanitation infrastructure 
projects in relation to informal settlement areas in the country, paying particular attention to the 
UISP. The UISP was the programme in terms of which Project Silvertown was implemented 
and is premised upon extensive community participation with beneficiary residents to the 
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upgraded services. An example was shown where the effective use of community participation 
led to improved adoption and sustainability of sanitation infrastructure projects. While 
community participation is believed to be an effective way to empower communities and 
improve the chances of project success, it is not without challenges and shortcomings. Power 
imbalances that exist between communities and government officials implementing projects 
can undermine participation processes to becoming an administrative façade.
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4  Methodology 
Public participation processes have been legislated in public infrastructure projects with hopes 
to improve the delivery of infrastructure and services – particularly in informal settlement areas. 
However, in practice challenges exist when incorporating various stakeholder expectations in 
projects of this nature. This poses a problem as it undermines the ability to understand the 
conflicts in stakeholder views and incorporate the knowledge of the public into participatory 
upgrades. 
This study aimed to determine the different perceptions and expectations held by stakeholders 
involved in participatory sanitation upgrades in informal settlements. To do this the two main 
research questions were asked. The first question asked was: What are the differences in 
perceptions and expectations between stakeholders in participatory upgrades? The second 
question asked was: What implications do the different perceptions and expectations of various 
stakeholders have on the success of participatory upgrades of informal settlements? 
The study made use of existing documentary resources which formed part of the High Court 
submissions. To analyse the data, the Critical Systems Heuristics framework was modified and 
used to surface stakeholder perceptions and expectations.  
4.1 Research design 
This study adopted an interpretivist research philosophy guided by a qualitative paradigm. 
Interpretivism makes use of language, values and interpretations to construct the social realities 
perceived by humans (Bandaranayake, 2012). This was in alignment to the overall project 
objective, looking to articulate the perceptions and expectations held by various stakeholder 
groups in participatory sanitation upgrades. Furthermore, the project aimed to understand the 
implications of the disjunctures which various stakeholders have that may contribute to the 
fuelling of public protest and poor adoption of sanitation interventions.  
The research design was based on a case study making use of Project Silvertown as the single 
in-depth case study. Flyvbjerg (2006) states that more often than not, many researchers believe 
a case-study strategy to be of little relevance in the academic world, as the findings in a case 
study do not allow for broader generalisations to be made about the wider systemic problem. 
Ethical Beliefs 
• Inter- and intra-generational equity 
• Personal educational values* 
• Right of co-existence (eco and 
human) and co-respect* 
• Personal ethical responsibilities* 
• Precautionary principle* 
• Interdependence  
• Honesty of practice, alignment of 




However, he counters this argument by suggesting that gaining deep insights into a single 
phenomenon is indeed advantageous as “a discipline without a large number of thoroughly 
executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a 
discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one” (Flyvberg, 2006:242).  
Project Silvertown was a significant event in South Africa which triggered both national and 
international debate on sanitation service delivery. It was the main catalyst behind the in-depth 
study to determine the status of the quality of sanitation services being provided in the country, 
an audit which had rarely been done prior to the event (Mjoli, 2010; DWA, 2012).  The 
importance of this particular case study within the wider discipline of sanitation service delivery 
in South Africa justifies for an extensive qualitative study. The aim is to help strengthen what 
is already known in existing resources on this matter by providing detailed contextual analysis 
and understanding of the events that transpired and the perceptions of the stakeholders involved. 
4.2 Research methodology 
For the purpose of this research, an adaptation of critical systems heuristics was the 
methodology applied to surface and critically articulate stakeholder perspectives within a given 
system. This theory brought to bear the comparative perspectives stakeholders have of 
participatory sanitation upgrades. The findings were then used to identify the potential problems 
for project success that could arise as a result of the conflicting stakeholder viewpoints.  
4.2.1 Critical Systems Heuristics  
Rooted in the traditions of critical systems thinking and practical philosophy, CSH is a 
philosophical framework devised by Werner Ulrich to support reflective practice in social 
planning. The CSH framework supports reflective practice by making “explicit the value 
assumptions underlying practical judgments by means of critical reflection” (Carr & Oreszczyn, 
2003:1).  
For the purpose of this framework, Ulrich redefined social planning (a term more commonly 
understood as a scientifically informed means for fulfilling a desired end) to be the art of 
promoting improvement within a system (Ulrich, 1996).  Often, experts and institutions holding 




driving the processes of improvement and making decisions regarding what the measure of 
improvement may be (Ulrich, 1987).   
However, like the thinking behind community participation, CSH drives the point that all social 
planning for improvement should be a public activity inclusive of all affected citizens, 
particularly when the involved planners are themselves not affected by the desired end result. 
However, this can pose an ethical dilemma, as a diverse stakeholder group may result in 
different factors being relevant (Carr & Oreszczyn, 2003).  
Improvement rarely means the same thing for everyone concerned. Promoting it 
inescapably implies preference; that is to say; it implies choice between the needs and 
values of different groups of people (Ulrich, 1996:9) 
The conflicts between stakeholder needs and values exist in all social planning processes. 
Choices on which some of those needs and values are prioritised over others will inevitably 
result in the processes not being able to serve all parties equally (Ulrich, 1996). Those with a 
high level of power, knowledge or influence will place their interests above other groups. The 
CSH framework is not able to justify the rationality of any particular proposal for improvement 
among these conflicting needs and interests.  
However, CSH does provide systematic critical means to reflect on the needs and values of not 
only professionals and experts involved in the planning, but the people involved and affected 
as well. This allows for the emancipation of the citizens who have to live with the proposed 
solutions by giving them a competent voice in the matters affecting them. Therefore, CSH frees 
citizen views from being undervalued and allows their knowledge to be deemed as credible as 
that of the technical experts (Ulrich, 1983).  
4.2.2 CSH boundary questions 
Conventional systems theory makes use of the idea of systems models as a means of learning 
about a particular situation in reality. Another way in which to view this can be understood as 
“the lens through which one might see the world” (Churchman cited by Ulrich & Reynolds, 
2010:246). CSH builds on this conceptual model by defining and structuring a situation or 




CSH uses 12 boundary judgments or questions to determine which facts and value 
considerations people deem to be relevant or irrelevant to define a reference system (Ulrich, 
2005). The boundary questions are shown in Table 1.  
The 12 questions are based on four sources of influence, namely motivation, focusing on the 
purpose achieved; control, pertaining to power distribution and decision-making processes; 
expertise, looking at those with the relevant knowledge; and legitimation, seeking emancipation 
from such claimed expertise or power (Jamaludin, 2012). Details regarding each source of 
influence are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
The 12 questions are designed in such a way as to make evident the four sources of influence. 
These questions answer three categories in each source of influence. The first relates to 
identifying “who” the stakeholder is in each source of influence. The second questions asks for 
“what” the stakeholder identified is/isn’t responsible in each of the four sources of influence. 
Finally, the third question seeks to identify the main stakeholding issue in that particular source 
of influence. The importance of these sources of influence is stressed by Ulrich who states that: 
these four issues are essential for reflective practice in most (if not all) situations of 
problem solving, decision-making, or professional intervention. They are essential since 
without considering them, we do not really understand what a claim means and whether 






Table 1: Boundary judgments and questions of CSH (Adapted from Ulrich 2005:11) 
 Boundary Judgments 
Sources of 
influence 
Social Roles (Stakeholders) Specific concerns (Stakes) 




1. Beneficiary     
Who is (ought to be) the client 
or beneficiary? That is, whose 
interests are (should be) served? 
2. Purpose    
 What is (ought to be) the purpose? 
That is, what are (should be) the 
consequences?  
3. Measure of improvement      
What is (ought to be) the 
measure of improvement or 
measure of success? That is, 
how can (should) we determine 
that the consequences, taken 




4. Decision-Maker     
 Who is (ought to be) the 
decision-maker? That is, who is 
(should be) in a position to 
change the measure of 
improvement?  
5. Resources 
What resources and other 
conditions of success are (ought to 
be) controlled by the decision-
maker? That is, what conditions of 
success can (should) those involved 
control?  
6.   Decision environment 
What conditions of success are 
(ought to be) outside the control 
of the decision-maker? That is, 
what conditions does (should) the 
decision-maker not control? 
Sources of 
knowledge 
7.    Expert 
Who is (ought to be) considered 
a professional or expert? That 
is, who should be (ought to be) 
involved as competent provider 
of knowledge, experience and 
expertise? 
8.   Expertise 
What kind of expertise is (ought to 
be) consulted? That is, what should 
count as relevant knowledge? 
9. Guarantor      
What or who is (ought to be) 
assumed to be the guarantor of 
success? That is, where do 
(should) those involved seek 
some guarantee that 
improvement will be achieved;  
for example, consensus among 
experts, the involvement of 
stakeholders, the experience and 
intuition of those involved, 




Who is (ought to be) witness to 
the interests of those affected 
but not involved? That is, who is 
(should be) treated as a 
legitimate stakeholder, and who 
argues (should argue) the case of 
those stakeholders who cannot 
speak for themselves, including 
future generations and non-
human nature?  
11. Emancipation 
What are (ought to be) the 
opportunities for the interests of 
those negatively affected to have 
expression and freedom from the 
worldview of the system? That is, 
where does (should) legitimacy lie?  
12. Worldview  
What worldview is (ought to be) 
determining? That is, what 
different visions of improvement 
should be considered, and how 





4.2.3 Systematic boundary critique 
Striving towards this non-elitist approach to social planning, Ulrich included the idea of 
boundary critique in CSH. Boundary critique is defined as being a “systematic – reflective and 
discursive – effort of handling boundary judgments critically, whereby ‘critically’ means both 
‘self-critically’ questioning one’s own claims and ‘thinking for oneself’ before adopting the 
claims of others” (Ulrich & Reynolds, 2010:256).   
This is a core concept of CSH as it “aims to sweep-in the maximum amount of information into 
the defined system boundary on one hand and poses the question for a rational justification of 
the boundaries through a debate between stakeholders on the other, thus making it an ethical 
process involving multiple viewpoints” (Jamaludin, 2012:56). By surfacing the underpinning 
boundary judgments of various parties, the critique helps parties to understand their own 
boundary assumptions, as well as those of other parties (Ulrich, 2005).  
4.2.4 CSH stakeholder definitions 
Stakeholder involvement and management in projects have increasingly gained the attention of 
academics and practitioners. However, the identification of stakeholders in any given SOI can 
prove to be a complex task (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007).  Olander and Landin (2005) have 
defined project stakeholders in construction projects as being “a person or group of people who 
have a vested interest in the success of a project and the environment within which the project 
operates” (Olander & Landin, 2005:1).  
Public infrastructure construction projects often require community participation processes; this 
adds another dimension to stakeholder engagement beyond the realm of organisational 
stakeholder management. This is because the citizen stakeholder group, together with 
organisational stakeholders, are given the opportunity jointly influence project outcomes, as 
well as share control over resources allocated to the project (Xie et al., 2014).  Therefore, 
community participation aims to involve the end-users affected in the decision-making process.  
CSH was developed to bear the civil society context in mind. The CSH framework distinguishes 
between two major stakeholder groups in any SOI, namely involved and affected agents (Vos, 




individual or group to belong to the affected or involved stakeholder group. Vos (2003) writes 
that the factors considered to belong to either group are that the person/group must: 
• Have a resource to contribute to the system of interest (expertise, financing, political power) 
• Actually or potentially be affected by the outcome of the system (end-users) 
 
This acts as a macro-filter, separating stakeholders from non-stakeholders, and serves as the 
first boundary judgment employed by Ulrich in identifying the pool of stakeholders in the 
system of interest.  
Beyond this macro-filter, a second boundary judgment is employed to differentiate the 
identified stakeholders into the involved and affected stakeholder groups. This stage helps sort 




the identified stakeholders by defining what is meant by involved stakeholders and affected 
stakeholders, and they are represented in Figure 5.  
Achterkamp and Vos (2007) state that involved stakeholders are the identified stakeholders who 
are actively involved in the achievement of the project objectives. This active involvement 
would be in the form of the stakeholders’ contribution of resources or the involvement of 
affected stakeholders in the outcome of the SOI.  
As seen in Figure 5, the involved stakeholder group is then further divided in the CSH 
framework into the sub-stakeholder groups: 
Client – This is “the party whose purposes are being served” (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007:8). 
These stakeholders are predominantly responsible for defining the project purpose and 
determining whether the resultant outcomes/objectives constitute an improvement in the SOI 
(Ulrich, 2005).  
Decision-Takers/-Makers – This group “sets the requirements regarding the project process 
and outcomes and evaluates whether these requirements are met” (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007:8). 
They predominantly control the resource allocation and conditions of success in any SOI.  
Planners/Experts – This stakeholder group contributes expertise or experience towards 
meeting the project deliverables (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007). They are contributors in the 
sources of knowledge required in the SOI and therefore are responsible in helping to assure that 
some improvement is achieved in the outcomes of the project.  
Ulrich restricts affected stakeholders to being those passively involved or otherwise “affected 
by the project outcomes or project process without being able to influence the process or 
outcomes” (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007:8). In his book, Ulrich (1983) gives a good example of 
this type of stakeholder, describing affected parties as people who are not in the position to be 
able to contest a decision or vote because of various factors such as being too young, not yet 
born, disabled or not having the capability to rationally express their concerns. Vos (2003) 
explains that owing to insufficient knowledge regarding the side-effects and long-term risks of 
a project, the affected group are often difficult to bind. Because of this, Ulrich bounds this 




classifies these representatives as witnesses, the fourth sub-stakeholder group in the framework. 
Witnesses are defined as a person/group elected to act on behalf of the greater affected 
stakeholder groups’ interests (Ulrich, 2005).  
4.3 Data collection 
CSH implies the use of interview methods using participants to answer each of the 12 questions 
CSH prescribes for the collection of the data required. However, instead of interviews, this 
study has adapted the CSH data collection method and made use of existing documentary 
resources available on Project Silvertown. Therefore, the answers to each of the 12 questions 
were constructed for each stakeholder group from an interpretation of the documents sourced. 
Instead of asking participants questions in both the is and ought to mode a further modification 
was made to the framework. For the purposes of this project, data gathered from the UISP, as 
well as the initial Project Silvertown project, proposals were used to answer the CSH questions 
in the ideal/ought to mode. The decision was taken to do this because the UISP and Project 
Silvertown proposals were documents, which stated how the project ought to have been 
implemented in an ideal state; therefore, making use of this documentation to frame the ideal 
mode of how the project ought to have been implemented from a policy perspective.  
To address questions in the is mode, responses from various stakeholders identified in the 
documentary resources sourced were used to generate answers to the questions for each 
stakeholder group. Information from the documents sourced were extracted to formulate 
responses to the questions posed in the CSH framework from various stakeholder perspectives. 
The documentary resources used included:  
• Internal documents from the CoCT regarding the project details obtained from the 
Western Cape High Court 
• Signed affidavits from several witnesses in various stakeholder groups 
• Minutes of meetings between the Silvertown Project Team Steering Committee obtained 
from the Western Cape High Court 
• Forensic investigation reports on the Silvertown housing project  




• UISP policy documentation  
• Journal articles on the toilet war saga 
• Newspaper clippings dated between 2010 and 2011. These clippings were sourced 
online, using the following search words used to find the newspaper articles: toilet war 
saga, Khayelitsha toilet war, and Makhaza toilet war. 
The internal project documents, signed affidavits, meeting minutes and forensic investigation 
reports were obtained from the Western Cape High Court and are public records.  
4.4 Data analysis 
Ulrich (2005) recommends CSH practitioners begin by first mapping the stakeholders involved 
in and affected by the system of interest. The main objective of this activity is to determine 
which individuals or groups represent the stakeholders within the given system of interest. As 
per Ulrich’s CSH framework, stakeholders need to either be involved with the planning of the 
system, affected by the intended plan or a mix of both involved and affected.  
Before stakeholders in the system are identified, Reynolds (2007) recommends that the plan’s 
SOI and its associated boundaries be clearly defined so as to better distinguish who is considered 
a stakeholder and determine “what belongs to the problem (the problem-relevant system) and 
what belongs to the problem environment” (Reynolds, 2007:n.p).  
However, for this research project, the data was first coded to make a distinction between the 
various stakeholder groups. Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) 
called NVivo10 was used for data handling and analysis. Figure 6 shows an example of how 
the data was sorted into each CSH question.  
Using NVivo, sourced textual data, which directly quoted or cited any individual or group, was 
extracted and sorted according to whether they were either a stakeholder or non-stakeholder. 
For this research project, only data from stakeholders who were involved prior to the case being 




stakeholders.  Once stakeholders and non-stakeholders were identified, the next step involved 
differentiating the stakeholders into their respective stakeholder groups. 
 
 
Figure 7: Example to show the process taken for sorting data sourced 
 
Again, for this step, Nvivo was used to sort the data into four stakeholder groups, namely 
government, community leaders, consultants or residents. Refer to Chapter 5.1 for a more 




data was sorted into the 12 questions falling into the four sources of influence, as per Ulrich’s 
framework, namely motivation, power, knowledge and legitimacy.  
The next step involved formulating answers for the 12 CSH questions for each stakeholder 
group, using the extracted textual data. After coding the data into the 12 questions, a secondary 
thematic analysis was done to identify any recurring patterns or relationships in the data to 
synthesise any disjunctures found between stakeholder groups into larger systemic problems.  
4.5 Validity 
Concerns are raised as to whether the textual data is sufficient to answer all the CSH questions 
adequately and furthermore, whether the researcher’s own reference system and bias have 
influenced the data analysed. To best answer the 12 CSH questions for each stakeholder group 
an attempt was made to access a wide range of data verbatim from the sources mentioned in 
Section 4.3.  
Reynolds (2007) recommends that any CSH practitioner reflect on their role in the SOI to 
identify any possible bias before conducting an evaluation. The practitioner’s involvement 
could range from being an independent observer, “expert” associated or involved in the project, 
an “expert” providing external and independent expertise on the project, or a “witness” 
representing the affected parties, or a combination of the mentioned roles. For this project, the 
researcher was an independent observer who had no contact with any of the known stakeholders 
and played no part in the selected case study. 
When explaining some of the answers constructed in Chapter 5, excerpts from the data extracted 
were included to provide the reader with reference of the data used for the constructed answers 
and mitigate the researcher’s subjectivity of data construction. Furthermore, the CSH 
framework provides frameworks that assist with objectivity as they help to identify issues that 
may be tacit or otherwise invisible. 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
This research project made use of project documents, signed affidavits, meeting minutes and 




sources. Ethical consideration regarding the privacy of stakeholders, informed consent, 
voluntary participation and anonymity were not considered to be relevant for this dissertation 
as all information sourced was readily available in the public domain. 
Prior to research being conducted, the study went through the ethics approval process with the 
Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at the University of Cape Town and was 




5 Analysis of CSH results 
This research project aimed to articulate the perceptions and expectations that stakeholders 
have in sanitation infrastructure projects with a view to understanding the implications this has 
towards the success of participatory upgrades.  
This chapter describes and analyses the answers constructed for each stakeholder group 
identified in Project Silvertown. The chapter begins with a stakeholder analysis to identify the 
various stakeholder groups involved in and affected by Project Silvertown. Following the 
stakeholder analysis is the summary of the constructed CSH answers from the textual data 
sourced. As mentioned in Chapter 4, data was sourced from the UISP, Project Silvertown 
application for subsidy approval document and the Project Silvertown project description 
document.  
These three documents were used to answer the ought to questions in the CSH framework, as 
they were developed to structure and frame how the project was envisioned to be administered. 
The constructed CSH answers to the ought to section are presented in the first table in each 
section. Stakeholder perspectives were used to answer the is questions in the CSH framework 
and are reflected in the second table in each section.  
5.1 Stakeholder analysis 
An initial analysis involved analysing the data to identify key players who featured in the data 
collected and group these representatives into stakeholder groups, depending on their 
involvement in the project. Within the bounded SOI, four stakeholder groups were recognised 
as being involved in or affected by the system of interest, namely the residents, community 
leaders, government branches and specialist consultants. Table 2 shows a detailed summary of 
the stakeholder groups in Project Silvertown and identifies the stakeholder representatives, as 
well as their primary roles in the project. 
The government branches and consultant stakeholders were identified as being part of the 
involved stakeholder group in the project. Their involvement in Project Silvertown served as 









Stakeholder Representatives Major Stakeholder Roles 
Government City of Cape 
Town (CoCT) 
Dan Plato - Mayor CoCT 
Douglas Norman - Head Projects Coordinator 
New Informal Settlements 
Theo Sethosa - Project Manager 
Herman Steyn - Manager: New Housing 
 Mzomba – Erstwhile Manager: New Housing 
The CoCT applied to the DoHS Western Cape Province for the approval of subsidies for Project Silvertown. As a 
municipal government, the City of Cape Town was responsible for the initiation, project management, management of 
funds, tender processes and other administrative duties for the project. They were involved in the project from 
conceptualisation through to the project completion. The responsibility lay with the CoCT to appoint and finance the 
relevant expertise required for this task, as well as approve the final design concept. They were responsible for the initial 
approval of the communal toilets for which they received funding from the Western Cape provincial government, as well 





Jan-Louis van der Walt - Director Human 
Settlement Policy Development 
The DoHS allocates money from the national housing programme to provinces to aid them in financing any national or 
provincial housing programme as per the framework of the Housing Act. They are also primarily responsible for 
provision of clarity on the interpretation of the UISP code.  
Province of the 
Western Cape 
Helen Zille - Premier 
Helgard Daniel Muller - Chief Engineer 
Mbulelo Service Tshangana – Head of DHS  
The Province of the Western Cape was responsible for the approval of the Silvertown Project proposal submitted by the 
CoCT. Upon approval of the project, they were the main project financiers, however, management of the funding 
remained the responsibility of the CoCT. A condition made by the Province of the Western Cape for this project was that 
the CoCT was to adhere to provisions of the National Housing Code to govern the decisions made in the project. 
Consultants Shamrock 
Plumbing 
Reg le Sar Civil contractor awarded the second tender to construct the 1 316 toilets without enclosures. 
Umzamo Civils 
CC 
PE Tom Civil contractor awarded the initial contract to build 282 communal toilets.  
Kwesi V3 
Engineers 
Deon Rossouw - Technical Director 
Rushied Abdurahman 
Contracted to provide technical details of the toilet structures required for the construction of the 1 316 individual toilets, 
and to prepare all documentation and specifications for tender. Upon the withdrawal from the project by Liebenberg & 






Nkosinathi Caso  
A Bishop 
Glen Honeyman 
Responsible for the facilitation of community participation processes, general project management and technical civil 
engineering design of the planned upgrade. Upon the decision taken by the CoCT to change to the 1 316 unenclosed 
toilets, the consulting firm decided to no longer be a part of the project. They were not in favour of the decision and also 








Stakeholder Representatives Major Stakeholder Roles 
Community 
Leaders 
SANCO & KDF Community-led Organisation  The CoCT approached existing community structures in the project area to form part of the Project Steering Committee 
and represent residents. 
Ward 
Councillors 
NG Gexa - Makhaza 
Ms LD Jelele - Silvertown 
Mkutswana - Town 2 
Formed part of the Project Steering Committee from the start of the project planning phase to act as representatives of the 
council within their respective wards. With the dissolution of the Project Steering Committee councillors were 
responsible for relaying the residents’ concerns to the CoCT and consultants, and communicate all decisions taken by the 




Andile Lili - Makhaza CLO 
Xoliswa Sondlo - Silvertown CLO 
Mthandozo Khope - Town 2 CLO 
Appointed by the civil contractors as extension of the contractor as a communication resource and link to the community 
on the behalf of the contractor with the contractor's interests at heart.  
Residents Makhaza Ntombentsha Beja  
Thembisa Princess Sokabo 
Andiswa Ngabi 




The residents and community leaders were both involved in and affected by the project. The 
involved and affected stakeholder group would ultimately be the end-users of the sanitation 
solution provided. In addition to the residents and community leaders, there were members 
within the community hired by the government branches and consultants to act as their 
communication links to the residents. These members were community liaison officers (CLOs). 
Although they were employed by organisations which were only involved with the project 
(government branches and consultant groups) owing to the fact that they were residents within 
the project area they too fell under the involved and affected or end-user group.  
There were several other parties recognised as key players who fell outside the system of interest 
and were neither directly involved in nor affected by the project outcome. As shown in Table 3, 
these parties were groups like the High Court of South Africa, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) and the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL). These 
parties all became involved in the latter part of the project and through investigations of the 
events leading to the public protest. While their direct roles were not considered within the SOI, 




Table 3: Project Silvertown external key players 




Appointed in 2010 as the judge to provide a verdict on the application filed by 
Mrs Beja and others against the Premier of the Western Cape and others. By this 
point the project had been running for six years. He was not involved in any of 
the events that led to the court case application filing, and therefore had no agency 
or control of any of the decisions that were made prior to the application being 
filed. However, once the case had been filed, he did play a pivotal role in closing 






Upon receiving a formal complaint from the ANCYL, the SAHRC embarked on 
an investigation into the matter. The investigation included several consultation 
and mediation sessions between the ANCYL, Makhaza residents and the CoCT. 
Findings from this investigation ruled that the CoCT had violated the right to 
dignity of the Makhaza residents, failed to provide adequate sanitation services to 
the citizens and followed an inadequate consultation process. Pregs Govender, the 
SAHRC Deputy Chairperson, was the main figure who played a prominent role 








The ANCYL are the youth wing of the ruling political party in South Africa since 
1994. In Project Silvertown, the Youth League served more as an interest group 
and not a political party, as they were not formally elected by the residents to stand 
as their representatives.  Although Andile Lili is a representative of both the CLOs 
and the ANCYL and lodged the complaint to both the SAHRC and High Court in 
his capacity as an ANCYL member, he could have used his function as a CLO to 





5.2 Summary of constructed CSH answers 
The following section summarises the answers constructed for each stakeholder group and 
highlights noteworthy excerpts of the data analysis. The answers are grouped as per Ulrich’s 
sources of influence, namely motivation, power, knowledge and legitimacy (Ulrich, 2005).  
Each question describes two viewpoints. Firstly, the ideal/ought to version describing what ought 
to occur in upgrading projects as found in the UISP, as well as the Project Silvertown 
documentation that was submitted for funding approval. Secondly, the actual viewpoints of each 
stakeholder group identified in Project Silvertown are presented. Distinctions will be raised for 
any instances where notable disjunctures were found within any of the stakeholder groups so as 
to maintain the integrity of the data analysed.  
5.2.1 Sources of motivation 
In the CSH framework, the three questions related to the sources of motivation dealt with 
defining the system’s sense of direction and values, as well as identifying which of the 
stakeholders is responsible for defining this. The three questions asked in this section were:  
1. Who is (ought to be) the client or beneficiary? 
2. What is (ought to be) the purpose? That is, what are (should be) the consequences?  
3. What is (ought to be) the measure of improvement or measure of success? That is, 
how can (should) we determine that the consequences, taken together, constitute an 
improvement? 
In essence, these questions aimed to determine whose interests the project served. The answers 







Who ought to be the client or beneficiary? That is, whose interests should be served?  
UISP 
No clear indication of who the client ought to be and whose primary interests 
should be served. A distinction is made between the beneficiary and the developer. 
The beneficiary refers to the residents receiving the upgrade. The developer refers 
to the government branch planning and implementing the upgrade. 
Project 
Documentation 
The developer is referred to as the City of Cape Town, and the beneficiary is 
referred to as the residents receiving the upgrades.  
  




The residents believed the CoCT was the client. This was because they believed 
Project Silvertown was only serving the interests of the CoCT. They felt that, as 
residents, their needs and interests were not met, as they were not happy with both 
the communal toilets, as well as the unenclosed toilets. 
CoCT 
The data suggested that, from the perspective of the CoCT, the client role was shared 
between the CoCT and residents, as the City stated that a solution was required, 
which would allow for the interests of both the beneficiaries and the developer to be 
met. The residents were defined as being the beneficiaries of the intended solution. 
The role of the municipality was seen as that of a developer through the provision 
and arranging the necessary goods or services required for the project success.  
Consultants 
The consultants made a clear distinction between the beneficiary and the client in the 
system. In the view of the consultants, the client was the City of Cape Town, whose 
needs they were required to meet.  The beneficiaries of the planned sanitation 
intervention were the residents, who were the concern of CoCT, and the consultants 
were only responsible to them through the CoCT.  
Regarding stakeholder roles, in Ulrich’s framework, the terms client and beneficiary are 
synonymous. He suggests that the client “refers to the group of people who are to benefit from a 
plan, the people whom the plan is to serve in the first place. Other possible terms would be 
'beneficiaries', or 'people in need', or whatever” (Ulrich, 1996:19). 
In the ought case, the language used in the USIP does not point directly to a client whose interests 
are meant to be served in an upgrading project. The terms developer and beneficiary are used in 




that “Municipalities act as developers” (DHS, 2009:27) and in the event where a municipality is 
unable to take this role, the provincial department is to assume that responsibility. The 
community members receiving the services are the said beneficiaries of the project. 
In the actual/is scenario, there was consensus among all stakeholder groups that the residents 
were the rightful beneficiaries in Project Silvertown. However, evidence in the data reflected that 
there was a differentiation made between the terms client and beneficiary by some of the 
stakeholders involved.  
The residents and community leaders were of the opinion that the CoCT was the client in Project 
Silvertown in the actual scenario. This was because they believed the City acted in their own 
interests and removed the residents’ claim as beneficiaries and end-users of the services to this 
role.  
The City continues to treat us as objects which should take whatever handouts it throws up and 
not as people who have feelings, choices and preferences. This attitude will invariably always 
cause confrontation and turmoil (Lili1 Answering Aff. 6:15). 
Extracts taken from meeting minutes held by the consultants and the CoCT demonstrated the 
view that the consultants believed the client and beneficiary roles were seen as being distinctly 
different from each other. They viewed the CoCT as the client and the residents as beneficiaries. 
The consultants also appeared to place the interests of the CoCT above those of the residents. 
“The certificate confirming strengths of casted concrete slabs is yet to be provided to KV3 
Engineers (FOURTH REQUEST). The Client stresses the importance of providing the 
certification, as it may negatively impact the certification of payment towards the Contractor, as 
a result of the concrete not being certified as correct." (KV3 Engineers, 2009a: 4.6) 
Drawings to each individual erf have been presented to the residing beneficiaries, to allocate as 
to where they would want the toilet structure placed. (KV3 Engineers, 2009b: 3.1.3. italics 
added) 
 
                                                 




The following statement made by the City took a view suggesting both they and the residents 
had interests that they needed to be served in this project.  
Part of the undertaking of the beneficiary to the developer will be the responsibility of the new 
property owner to fulfill his/her obligations in respect of rates and services charges payable to 
the municipality (City of Cape Town, 2003: 4:2.10). 
To summarise, the UISP and project documentation gave no clear indication of who the client in 
an upgrading project ought to be; however, they were consistent in the identification of the role 
of the municipality being the developer (CoCT) and the residents being the beneficiaries. The 
residents and community leaders felt that the CoCT ended up taking that role, as the City put 
their interests above the residents’ interests as the end-users.  
Similar to language used in the UISP, the CoCT was also consistent with the distinction between 
the developer and the beneficiary. However, the language in the data collected showed that the 
City believed that both the CoCT and residents were the client because they both had interests 
that were met with the project outcome. The only stakeholder group who spoke directly of a 
client and beneficiary in the project was the consultant group. However, they made a distinction 
between the two terms. They considered the client to be the CoCT and the beneficiary to be the 
residents, and were primarily more concerned with meeting the interests of the CoCT. The 
inability to clearly define the client in the ought to scenario had a negative implication of causing 






What ought to be the purpose? That is, what should the consequences be?  
UISP 
The overall USIP policy intent aims at the significant improvement in the lives of 
slum dwellers. The consequences to this improvement are threefold, namely to 




The City envisaged to complete the township and to have the residents provided 
with adequate land ownership and serviced erven. Prior to the provision of houses, 
communal taps and toilets would be provided as an interim service. 
Residents  
The residents envisaged the purpose to be to formalise the area, limit the 
overcrowding and improve living conditions in terms of health, safety and hygiene 
in the community.  
  




Contrary to what they envisaged, residents believed the actual purpose of the 
project was to provide whatever the cheapest solution was to the residents without 
consideration of their human dignity or quality of life.  
CoCT 
To formalise the township and address the housing, water and sanitation needs of 
the community 
Consultants 
To upgrade the informal settlement and provide sanitation services to the 
beneficiaries/residents in the Silvertown area to the specifications of the CoCT 
The UISP states that the programme was purposed to improve the lives of slum dwellers in South 
Africa through 3 different objectives. The first objective looks at formalising the tenure rights of 
residents in informal settlements as a means of enhancing citizenship. The second objective 
speaks to the promotion of a safe and healthy environment for residents through the provision of 
affordable housing and basic services. The third objective the UISP sets out to meet is that of 
empowerment of the community through the promotion of social and economic inclusivity 
through participatory processes.  
The UISP also states that interim services that provide the residents with basic services, such as 
access to water and sanitation, must always be seen to not only be a temporary solution, but also 
serve as the first phase of the provision of permanent services. Furthermore, the type of services 




The programme provides funding for the installation of interim and permanent municipal 
engineering services. Where interim services are to be provided it must always be undertaken on 
the basis that such interim services constitute the first phase of the provision of permanent 
services, the nature and level of permanent engineering infrastructure must be the subject of 
engagement between the local authority and Residents (DHS, 2009: 9). 
As mentioned previously, for the ought section, responses were constructed using data obtained 
from the UISP and project documentation. In the project documentation a section relating to the 
various stakeholders’ motivations for Project Silvertown were recorded and highlighted what the 
government and resident stakeholder groups envisioned the project motivations ought to have 
been. What was interesting to note was that from project conception the project documentation 
noted that the community leaders and the CoCT had differing motivations for what Project 
Silvertown ought to achieve. The residents and community leaders believed the provision of 
individual household toilets ought to have been a means of dignifying the community members. 
They envisioned the intended consequence of the project as being an overall improvement in 
their quality of life with respect to health, hygiene and safety of all residents in the area.  
The motivation from the community is to limit the overcrowding and to improve the poor 
hygiene and living conditions that prevail on the site in its current format. The motivation of the 
greater Khayelitsha community is to establish a safe and formalised area that can fulfill the 
housing needs (City of Cape Town, 2003: 4:2.12) 
However, residents and community leaders believed that the actual purpose of the project became 
focused on the provision of the cheapest solution available with little consideration to what they 
had envisioned. The initial communal toilets that the City had provided were not what they 
wanted and the decision to do so had not been adequately communicated to them. Regardless of 
whether the communal toilets were meant to be an interim or permanent service, the residents 
felt as though the construction of these facilities did not fall in line with their initial purpose for 
the improvement of health and safety of the community. It was only after their cries for individual 







It is so that the communal toilets were built prior to the community being moved to the new 
erven. It came as a huge disappointment that people were supposedly being upgraded and the 
quality of their lives being improved; yet they had to continue living in shacks and use communal 
toilets. This did not make logic. It was on this basis that people wanted their own toilets. This 
concern was raised in the regular and structured meetings with the contractor over a sustained 
period since at least 2007 (Forensic Services Department, 2010: 5:13).  
 
However, the CoCT and consultants took a different position on the purpose of the project. The 
City made it clear that their main purpose was focused on the provision of land ownership and 
serviced erven.  
The motivation from the City is to complete the township and to have the residents provided 
with adequate land ownership and serviced erven (City of Cape Town, 2003: 4:2.12). 
 
The water and sanitation needs of this community are not adequately met. This project will 
address the housing need of the 2 200 families that are not located on formal/ serviced erven 
(City of Cape Town, 2003: 2:2.4). 
 
In this regard, the City believed it had not only achieved the intended objective, but they had 
actually provided above what was required of them as per the UISP by providing individual 
toilets instead of communal toilets.  
In my consolidated affidavit the City noted that, properly interpreted, the provisions of the Code 
dealing with the UISP only require communal toilets on a basis of 1 toilet to 5 erven. Individual 
toilets will follow when houses are constructed (in phase 4. of the upgrade of an area). In the 
Makhaza area the City not only constructed such communal toilets, but it also supplied individual 
toilets (which the beneficiaries would enclose) (Plato2 Replying Aff.,  9:18). 
 
In summary, the UISP’s overall objective is to improve the lives of informal settlement dwellers 
focusing particularly on the provision of serviced erven targeted at promoting, health, safety and 
                                                 




empowerment of the end users. The Silvertown Project Description document highlights that the 
CoCT and Residents had different motivations for the project (CoCT, 2003). The Residents saw 
the provision of services and a formalised area as a means to an end: the end being improved 
health and safety. Contrary to what they had envisioned, the Residents believed that the purpose 
became to provide the Residents with the most affordable solution possible with no regards to 
the consequences this would have on their desired improvement of health and safety. The CoCT’s 
focus was primarily on land ownership and the provision of municipal services, and they believed 
that they not only met their intended purpose, but they had surpassed it through the provision of 





What ought to be the measure of improvement or measure of success? That is, how 
should we determine that the consequences, taken together, constitute an improvement? 
UISP 
• Performance against expenditure targets 
• Access to water and sanitation 
• Health indicators 
• Tenure 
• Decline in crime 
• Improved social and economic activity 
• Beneficiary satisfaction survey 
Project 
Documentation 
 CoCT  
The measure of improvement ought to be the provision of formalised erven 
and services for approximately 2 000 inhabitants of the Silvertown 
community. 
Residents 
Formalised housing and the establishment of a dignified, private, safe and 
hygienic environment for the residents 
  
What is the measure of improvement or measure of success? That is, how can we 
determine that the consequences, taken together, constitute an improvement? 
Residents and 
Community Leaders 
The actual measure of improvement was the provision of basic but 
undignified sanitation services and the signed “happy letters”.  
CoCT 
The measure of improvement was the provision of adequate formalised 
sanitation services to approximately 2 000 residents to establish a self-
sufficient community capable of economically benefitting the country.  
Consultants 
The measurement of success was the signed “happy letters” obtaining the 
satisfaction of the community upon completion of the unenclosed toilet 
installation. 
The UISP have several performance indicators which are outlined to measure the success of an 
informal settlement upgrade. These indicators look at the socio-economic, financial and 
infrastructural factors. In addition to the indicators measured by them, they also require that 
municipalities run a beneficiary satisfaction survey to determine whether the upgrade has made 
a meaningful impact to the residents’ lives. 
The following indicators should form part of an approved business plan and should be used to 




• Performance against the work plan and expenditure targets contained in the approved final 
business plan;  
• Improvements in living conditions measured through: - Health indicators (particularly decline 
in waterborne diseases and infant mortality rates, where these indicators have been recorded and 
are available); - Access to water and sanitation (households having access to “improved” 
drinking water and sanitation; - Tenure (number of households with secure tenure); - Economic 
activity (increased number of business opportunities and number of temporary and permanent 
jobs created); - Social amenities (increased number and affordability of social and recreational 
facilities);- Social capital (particularly family stability and community cohesion); a - Decline in 
crime (crime statistics). … - A beneficiary satisfaction survey to determine the impact of the 
development impact on their lives (DHS, 2009:35). 
 
Regarding the project documentation relating to the Silvertown upgrades, there was no specific 
mention of evaluation criteria for the project. However, comparing the performance indicators 
as set out in the UISP and the project purposes for the CoCT and the residents, as stated in 
Question 2, the deductions on the types of indicators on which each stakeholder group focused 
are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
The project documentation indicated that the residents’ success/improvement indicators were 
targeted towards health and socio-economic indicators (crime, hygiene and a formalised area). 
However, in actual fact they believed the measure of success of the project ended up focusing on 
the signed “happy letters” and the provision of basic but undignified services. The initial 
communal toilets that were provided did not meet their success criteria for the promotion of a 
healthy and hygienic environment, which is why the community halted the construction of these 
structures. 
Community leaders and residents were of the belief that the agreement made between them and 
the City for unenclosed toilets would result in the City fast-tracking the construction of houses 
to three months to enclose the toilets in their newly built homes. The building of unenclosed 
toilets was seen as a temporary concession that would result in a more desirable long-term 
solution. When houses did not materialise after three months of the installation of the open toilets, 




I have spoken to other members of our community and they seem to have understood the issues 
in the same way - that open toilets would be integrated into a house which was going to be built 
within a period of 3 months. To the extent that it is alleged that we accepted these open toilets, I 
point out that is was on condition and only on condition that they were part and parcel of a house, 
which was to be constructed on the land within a period of 3 months. I would not have accepted 
the construction of an open toilet if it were not part of a house (Beja3 Founding Aff. 5:15-16). 
 
The City and consultants denied allegations that there was an agreement made for them to 
provide houses to the residents, which would enclose the toilets three months after the installation 
of the toilets. While the plan was to enclose the toilet structure eventually, timelines to when this 
would happen were never communicated. The toilet enclosures built by the residents would 
remain for an indefinite period of time.  
In the circumstances I, and all of the City's officials, scrupulously avoided making any 
suggestion to the CLOs or members of the community which would suggest that houses would 
follow immediately. We were particularly anxious to raise false expectations (Caso4 Affidavit,  
6:16).  
 
The measures of improvement for the residents and community leaders leaned towards 
improvement in health, safety and other intangible measures.  This sentiment did not seem to be 
shared by the CoCT and consultants. Instead, the CoCT viewed the measure of improvement of 
the project in a more matter-of-fact view, focusing on tangible deliverables such as the number 
of toilets installed and increased access to formalised services. This implies that the residents 
held a deeper ideological view of the provision of formalised sanitation services that was more 
aligned with the UISP than the CoCT and the consultants.
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5.2.2 Sources of power  
In the CSH framework the questions related to the Sources of Power deal with defining who 
provides the necessary means as well as authority on decisions within a system. The three 
questions asked are:  
4. Who is (ought to be) the decision-maker? That is, who is (should be) in a position to 
change the measure of improvement? 
5. What resources and other conditions of success are (ought to be) controlled by the 
decision-maker?  
6. What resources and other conditions of success are (ought to be) outside the control 
of the decision maker? 
This section covers the stance as per the UISP and stakeholder perceptions of the decision makers 








Who ought to be the decision-maker? That is, who should be in a position to change the 
measure of improvement?  
UISP 
Clear decision-making powers given to the MECs to approve the 
proposal for the upgrading process. Beyond the approval of the project 
there is no clear indication as to who the decision-maker is.  
Project Documentation 
No explicit references as to who the decision-maker is; however, the data 
implies the City of Cape Town to be the decision-makers in the project. 
 
  
Who is the decision-maker? That is, who is in a position to change the measure of 
improvement?  
Residents 
Residents believed the City of Cape Town was the sole decision-maker.  
CoCT 
The structure of the Project Steering Committee did not give residents or 
their representatives any decision-making powers;  only advisory status. 
However, the City believed that they had made every effort to engage 
with the community and negotiated with the residents to find a solution 
to their development beyond what was legally required for them to fulfill. 
No decision was made without the consideration and buy-in from the 
community.  
National Government 
The City of Cape Town took the role of the decision-maker, thus 
neglecting the residents’ interests. 
Consultants 
The City of Cape Town made the final decision with the input and 
consultation from the community members. 
Community Leaders 
Despite the efforts, community representatives who were made to 
negotiate various decisions within the project felt that the City of Cape 
Town had disregarded their opinions and had made autonomous 
decisions. In an attempt to reclaim their decision-making power, 
community leaders organised protests against several decisions taken by 
the City.  
 
In the UISP, the only explicit mention made of a decision-maker referred to the MEC’s having 




made for upgrading projects. Beyond this mention, there was no clear indication as to who were 
to make the decisions once the project was up and running. The documents did highlight the 
importance of community participation processes in upgrading projects. It mentioned the 
important role that players such as ward committee members played in the success of these 
projects. It mandated municipalities to provide a structured agreement between the community 
and municipality to demonstrate effective community participation. 
The programme is premised upon extensive and active community participation. Funding is 
accordingly made available to support the social processes. Community participation should be 
undertaken through Ward Committees with ongoing effort in promoting and ensuring the 
inclusion of key stakeholders and vulnerable groups in the process. The municipality must 
demonstrate effective interactive community participation (DHS, 2009:15). 
  
In order to ensure that community members assume ownership of their own development and 
project, the involvement of the community from the onset is key. Hence, community 
participation should be undertaken within the context of a structured agreement between the 
municipality and the community (DHS, 2009:30). 
 
Although the UISP stresses the importance of community participation through every process of 
the upgrade project, no mention is made with regard to the community’s decision-making 
powers. The Silvertown documentation again makes no specific mention as to whom the 
decision-makers in the project are. However, it clearly states the groups who do not have 
decision-making powers – namely the Project Steering Committee (PSC). The excerpt from the 
project description document, compiled by the CoCT in 2003, dealt with the formation of the 
Project Steering Committee (PSC). The PSC was a group comprising of representatives from the 
City, contractors and elected community representatives. What it suggests is that, although the 
City has created platforms to hear the opinions from the community, their concerns are only 
taken under advisement for the City to ultimately reach a final decision. It should be noted that 
the elected community representatives, SANCO and the KDF later left the project. It is implied 
in the data that political reasons have been the cause of their departure from the PSC.   
The community participation processes commenced in November 2003. The project manager 




Khayelitsha. Role players and organisations that have an active interest in the Silvertown project 
and have a genuine concern that the end result of any development is successful were targeted 
to form a Steering Committee (City of Cape Town, 2004:5). 
 
A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was democratically elected by the Silvertown community 
and has been issued with a document defining their Terms of Reference. SANCO5 and KDF6 are 
existing community structures within the Khayelitsha and Silvertown area. They have been 
actively involved in the Steering Committee meetings that have been held monthly since 
November 2003 and have been actively involved in the development process. The Terms of 
Reference of the Steering Committee are available on request … The purpose of the Committee 
is to provide strategic direction, support and lobbying with regard to the development of the 
project on technical matters. It has advisory status and has no delegated authority for making 
decisions (City of Cape Town, 2004: 5:3.5. emphasis added). 
 
At national government level, the Department of Human Settlements believed the City did not 
meet the requirements regarding community participation as prescribed in the UISP. In their 
view, both the City and the residents ought to have had equal power in decision-making processes 
but instead, the CoCT took advantage of their control of resources to take control over all 
decision-making aspects.   
The City's decision to install unenclosed toilets lack all the attributes of reasonableness and 
fairness; the decisions are unlawful and violate a plethora of constitutional rights and ultimately 
constitute an abuse of public power and resources to deprive persons with bare necessities of life 
(Arendse, Masuku & Sidaki, 2011: 31:59). 
 
The residents and community leaders had similar views to that of national government. Ideally, 
residents and community leaders were open to the idea of shared governance; however, they felt 
as though the City had removed their decision-making powers - making the CoCT the sole 
decision-makers. 
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Our intention has always been and continues to be to cooperate with the City for the good of our 
community (Lili Answering Aff., 4:10). 
 
From what I have observed of the DVDs it is my view that they show a community crying out 
loud for meaningful consultation and inclusive decision making by the City. They also show a 
community, which does not appreciate being undermined (Lili Answering Aff., 9:23). 
 
However, the City stated several times how seriously they had taken the responsibility to engage 
with community members and to include their views in decisions made. They stated that their 
efforts in doing this were evident in the City seeking consultation with residents and diverting 
from the national minimum standard of communal toilets to the provision of individual toilets.  
The City's solution of providing toilets, to be enclosed by the beneficiaries, was a pragmatic and 
well-intended solution arrived at in consultation with the community, enabling the beneficiaries 
to take better advantage of the serviced stands (Tshangana7 Aff., 10:24). 
 
Had the City simply insisted that it could offer no more than the communal toilets, it would have 
satisfied the minimum requirements of the Code. The Residents would then have had no legally 
enforceable complaint against the City. The City's officials however always viewed communal 
toilets as a compromise and sought to consult with the community regarding a preferable 
solution. Following extensive consultation to find a better way of providing sanitation facilities, 
on 25 November 2007 at a public meeting held on a Sunday between the City and the affected 
beneficiary community, it was agreed that ... the city would supply in addition to the communal 
toilets ... 1 316 individual toilets ... the beneficiaries would be responsible for enclosing the 
additional individual toilets on their own (Fairbridges Attorneys, 2011:13:22.13.) 
 
In conclusion, regarding decision-making powers, the national government, residents and 
community leaders believed that the City had manipulated community participation processes to 
their benefit and did not regard the residents’ opinions when making decisions. Although the 
City claimed to have included residents in decisions made, the CoCT also implicitly stated that 
                                                 




they believed decision-making to be the role of the City. They made use of community 
participation platforms as advisory boards to assist in decisions they would make and 
communicate decisions to the public through those means. The actions of the City were not in 
direct conflict to the requirements as stated by the UISP, as the UISP does not indicate that 
community participation ought to translate directly to the community being given decision-
making powers.  




What resources and other conditions of success ought to be controlled by the decision-
maker? That is, on what sources of decision power should the project rely?  
UISP Land, financial resources, human capital 
Project 
Documentation Land, financial resources, human capital 
  
What resources and other conditions of success are controlled by the decision-maker? 
That is, on what sources of decision power does the project rely?  
Residents 
The residents believed they had little control of any of the conditions of success 
and that the City of Cape Town had control of almost all aspects of the project but 
displayed poor control of the financial resource budgeting of the project. 
CoCT 
The City believed they controlled the land and human resources necessary to 








They believed that, although they were responsible for overall budget allocation to 
provinces, it was provincial and local government who were to allocate project 
funding according to the type of development selected and other projects which 
might require funding. 
Consultants 
Land, infrastructure, financial budgeting of funding provided to the City, control of 
human resources employed for the project 
Community 
Leaders 
The community representatives believed that the City of Cape Town tried to 
remove the rights of the residents to control their own development and share their 
knowledge of the social climate so they could control almost all aspects of the 
project. What was important to note was that they recognised that the City 
controlled the financial resources but displayed poor control of the financial 
resource budgeting of the project. 
On the matter of resources, the UISP and project documentation pointed to three main physical 
resources needed for upgrading projects, namely land resources, financial resources and human 
capital. The project documentation noted the fact that the City of Cape Town already owned the 
land where the proposed upgrades were to take place and that they had sufficient human 
resources to execute the project. The resource most mentioned was the financial resources the 




for the allocation of project financing on provincial government, in partnership with the local 
municipality.  
The PDs will be responsible for the funding and implementation of this programme in 
partnership with municipalities. PDs must do everything in their power to assist municipalities 
to achieve their obligations under this programme. The following are some of the 
responsibilities provincial government should have to perform: … Reserve, reprioritise and 
allocate funds from its annual budget allocation and manage, disburse and control funds 
allocated for an approved project, in accordance with an agreement with a municipality (DHS, 
2009:21). 
 
In the actual scenario, there seemed to be consensus between all groups that the City was the 
stakeholder in control of the majority of resources necessary for the project implementation. 
Where considerable attention and disjuncture among stakeholders lay was within the control of 
financial resources for the project. The extent of control the City had regarding financial 
resources was a point of divergence between stakeholder groups.  
Within the government groups there were disagreements on the funding structures between 
local, provincial and national government. At local government level, the City believed that 
they had control over the project budgeting, but that they lacked control of the overall budget 
allocated to the project. In their view, funding remained within the sphere of provincial and 
national government, and there were restrictions as to the amount of funding which was 
available to them as per the UISP.  
Despite these demands, the City cannot claim any additional amount for implementing a UISP, 
save for a small supplement for geotechnical expenses. The result is that in most cases it simply 
is not possible to supply adequate services, and to still hold back some funds for the erection 
of individual toilets enclosed with brick-and-mortar or pre-cast concrete structures. The City is 
however dependent on the national and provincial spheres of government to provide funding 
for all projects it undertakes to promote the progressive realization of the right to housing - 
including related aspects such as access to land and services (Fairbridges Attorneys, 2011: 
27:45). 
 
The City’s initial application for funding was premised on the temporary installation of the 1:5 




Provisions for individual enclosed toilets per erf is generally not prescribed under the UISP and 
could not be met within their budget. However, when residents raised their disapproval over the 
construction of communal toilets the City believed they sought to come to a joint decision with 
the residents for the installation of unenclosed toilets which the residents would then enclose 
themselves. Examples of the City’s view on this matter are as follows: 
Significantly funding for a UlSP does not include any component for the provision of toilets to 
each erven. All that it covers is a sewerage pipe to each property, which rises slightly above 
ground-level. The City however realises that a sewerage connection by itself is of limited utility 
to poor people, and accordingly utilises some of the allocated funding under the UISP for the 
construction of individual enclosed toilets on each erf. For budgetary reasons however, this was 
not possible in the Silvertown project (Fairbridges Attorneys, 2011: 12:22.9). 
 
Where residents would prefer or insist on one toilet per household, this would not be affordable 
from either the service portion of the grant or the top structure portion when the housing subsidy 
would ultimately be utilised for those that qualify for such subsidies. However, a basis for 
providing one toilet per household and remaining within the allocated project budget would be 
to secure the agreement of the Residents to enclose the toilets utensils themselves (Muller8 
Answering Aff., 25:54). 
 
The UISP and its funding structure does not provide for the construction of enclosed toilets on 
each erf, in advance of top structure construction…While the cost of the construction of such 
toilets could conceivably be brought under the UISP interim service provision of R2 966,74 per 
household (as suggested on behalf of the national minister), in truth the interim services 
contemplated in the UISP appear to be of a different character, that is to say communal and 
temporary. Nor is the amount provided for adequate to cover the cost of constructing an 
enclosed toilet facility (Tshangana Aff., 11:24). 
 
Provincial government, however, felt as though national government was ultimately responsible 
for the allocation of funding, as the latter determined the requirements set up as per the UISP, 
which governed the amount of funding they could allocate to a project. Furthermore, onus was 
                                                 





also given to the City as they were the parties who determined the nature of the project to be 
emergency or interim services when they applied for funding. Had they determined that the 
project required permanent services, they could have sought funding under a programme outside 
of the UISP.  
In this regard, the Province's hands are tied by what is determined by national government. If 
this Court or national government were to conclude that the provision of full services to an 
informal settlement in principle requires the construction of enclosed toilets on each site, 
national government would have to make the necessary alterations to the UISP and its funding 
mechanisms (Tshangana Aff., 12:26). 
 
National government explained that the UISP was designed for the upgrading of in-situ informal 
settlements. In the case of Project Silvertown, the City could have applied for funding for 
permanent infrastructure from a different programme based on the fact that two of the three 
sites they had planned to upgrade (Makhaza and Town 2) were greenfield sites. In addition, 
national government stated how the UISP was not to be considered a rigid programme, but more 
of a guideline for development that should be able to accommodate for the context of the 
community for whom it is providing services. Funding allocated by national government to 
provincial government was not project-specific. The responsibility lay with both local and 
provincial government to allocate their resources accordingly.  
The UlSP does make provision for the interim provision of services. These services cover more 
than a sewerage pipe, as alleged by the City. The UlSP has been designed to address the specific 
development requirements posed by informal settlements. Hence, it is flexible to ensure that it 
can address locally particular development requirements and becomes a specially designed 
funding mechanism…the Code recognizes the need for flexibility in order to take account of 
the diverse living conditions across the country. It accordingly recognizes that the provision of 
interim services during phase 2 of informal settlement upgrading projects could entail 
communal water and sanitation services. I must however emphasize that this is not a prescribed 
minima  (Van der Walt9 Answering Aff., 19:37.2). 
 
                                                 




In an affidavit filed on behalf of the Minister of Human Settlements (sixth respondent), the 
Minister asserts that unenclosed toilets are not sanctioned by the governing national legislative 
framework; concept of communal toilets as acceptable on a ratio of 1 toilet is to 5 families is 
permissible only under an emergency housing programme; the Code does allow for 
beneficiaries to actively participate in decision-making over the housing process and the 
housing product, adequate funding was made available by the National Department to the 
Province to provide "fully enclosed toilet facilities based on current market prices (Van der 
Walt Answering Aff., 27:51). 
 
Indeed, on the facts (as they appear in HDM2 to Muller's affidavit),the Province advised the 
City as follows: "At this stage, no dedicated funding for the UlSP is available as envisaged by 
the policy document. 'This implies that this project must be funded from the annual allocation 
of the Department to the Municipality. If necessary, the Municipality must reprioritize its 
housing projects to fulfil its commitments." I reiterate, that subject to what I have stated in my 
explanatory affidavit, the Department does not allocate funding to provinces on a project basis. 
Funding for the implementation of the National Housing Programmes are annually allocated in 
terms of the Division of Revenue Act and provinces must apportion the funds so allocated in 
terms of current contractual commitments provincial planning, and agreed priorities. 
Accordingly, any additional financial cost implications as a result of this application must be 
borne by the Province and City  (Van der Walt Answering Aff., 65:34). 
 
The residents and community leaders viewed the CoCT to be solely responsible for all financial 
resources. They felt that the City from the onset ought to have allocated enough funding for the 
provision of individual toilets that would have been enclosed. Furthermore they did not believe 
that the City did not have enough funding to enclose the toilets, in their view the City did not 
want to spend any additional funding to assist the community.  
The only issue which was raised was why the government had not properly planned and 
provided enough money to allow individual toilets which could be included in each shack. 
There was a general murmur supporting a statement that this matter resulted from a failure to 
plan properly from the start (Caso Affidavit, 11:39). 
 






It was always our understanding that the City was provided with enough funds from the national 
government, alternatively that it had sufficient funds of its own, to fully develop our area (Lili 
Replying Aff.,  5:12). 
 
In conclusion, what stood out as being noteworthy in the data regarding the control of project 
resources was the disjuncture between local, provincial and national government on the UISP 
funding structure. While all stakeholders identified financial resources as being an important 
factor in the project, the difference of opinion concerned who was in control of this resource 
and the availability of financial resources.  
The UISP placed the majority of the responsibility of allocation of financial resources to 
projects on provincial departments. The City believed provincial and national government to be 
in control and were of the view that the financial limitation of not being able to build 
individually enclosed toilets was owing to the UISP policy legislated by national government.  
National government explained that the CoCT had the opportunity to seek funding under 
different programmes, which might have resulted in more money being made available for the 
type of services the residents had preferred. In addition, national government believed the onus 
was on both municipalities and provincial government to adequately allocate the lump sum 
funding given to them by national departments annually. Should a local municipality not budget 
the project accordingly, the responsibility is theirs to reprioritise their housing budget to commit 
to the completion of projects already in progress.  
Residents and community leaders believed that the City of Cape Town manipulated their control 





What conditions of success ought to be outside the control of the decision maker? That 
is, what conditions should the decision-maker not control? 
UISP 
Roles of government are based on principles of co-operative governance. 
Residents should be involved in every step of the project process. 
Project Documentation 
Project documentation does not give decision-making powers to 
government on the choice of housing option the residents prefer. Instead 
they are given the choice of the option they prefer that falls within the 
subsidy amount for which they qualify. 
  
What conditions of success are outside the control of the decision maker? That is, what 
conditions does the decision-maker not control? 
Residents and 
Community Leaders 
Both stakeholder groups believed that no conditions were outside the 
control of the CoCT. Residents believed that the City controlled 
everything and that they, as residents, had no control of what the 
determined conditions of success were to be despite their efforts. 
CoCT They believed that funding allocated to project and policies prescribed 
by provincial and national government were outside of their control. 
Consultants No distinct info found on this 
 
Responses to what conditions of success ought to be outside the control of the decision-maker 
were difficult to construct owing to the limited data available. In the ideal situation, the UISP 
outlines several functions for the roles municipalities, provincial departments and national 
government should play in an upgrading project. It also highlights the fact that government 
should be seen to function in a cooperative way, acting as one entity and assisting each of the 
different spheres of government to ensure the success of the project. It does stress the need to 
include the community in every stage of the project. In the Silvertown Project motivation 
document, the section describing the motivation of choice removed the City from dictating the 
housing options for the residents. It states clearly that, based on the subsidised amount given to 




The projects are undertaken on the basis of a partnership of cooperative governance between 
the relevant municipality, the PD, and the National Department (DHS, 2009:14). 
 
Every beneficiary will be afforded the choice of housing option that he/she may want to acquire 
within the subsidy qualification (CoCT, 2003). 
 
In the actual scenario, the cooperative governance, as envisioned by the UISP, appeared to not 
have taken place in Project Silvertown. The provincial department felt that there were aspects 
that fell outside of their involvement and control. Examples of what they believed fell outside 
of their control were the decision taken for the provision of the open toilets and the “happy 
letters” which were signed between the residents and the City. They saw their role in the project 
as being solely responsible for the evaluation, approval of funding and monitoring of the project. 
They believed that primarily it was the municipality that had executive authority for all matters.  
I confine myself to the Province's own involvement in the project, which was limited to 
evaluation, approval, funding and monitoring of the implementation thereof (Muller Aff., 
2010:3:5).  
 
The Province was not involved in the actual provision of the toilets which forms the subject 
matter of this application. It was not party to the interactions and subsequent agreement between 
the City and the community (Muller Aff., 2010:22:44). 
 
They acknowledged the fact that the signed Memorandum of Understanding between the 
provincial department and City of Cape Town required that the City ought to inform the 
Department in the event of any changes to the scope of the project. However, members of the 
Department attested to the fact that they were never informed of the decision taken by the City 
to install unenclosed toilets and therefore deny any involvement relating to that matter.  
This finding shows a breakdown between what was mandated legislatively, namely cooperative 





I deny the allegation in paragraph 7 that the Province provided open toilets for the Applicants. 
I have pointed out the role played by the Province in the implementation of the Silvertown 
upgrade project. The City was the developer and it provided the infrastructure to the residents 
of Makhaza (Muller Aff., 2010:23:5). 
 
There was never a formal decision at executive or council level to provide unenclosed toilets. 
This was an ad hoc agreement between officials and the community representatives to meet 
demands in a specific project. This was never conveyed to me in my capacity as Mayor or 
Premier (Zille10 Aff., 2010:9:14). 
 
In this regard, it bears emphasising that the Province is only one role player in human settlement 
development and not all elements are within its direct control (Tshangana, Aff, 2010:2). 
 
The residents believed that the City of Cape Town was in control of all the project conditions 
but that they would have liked it to have been a more cooperative process between the City and 
the residents. They felt that they had no control over anything relating to the project despite 
their efforts to engage with the City.  
We are not happy. We are complaining about toilets without covers. Now, instead of doing 
what we want, they just take off the toilets. We’re feeling that government destroyed us11 
(Eyewitness, 2010:n.p). 
 
Furthermore, the community leaders believed that the City of Cape Town did not attempt 
sharing control of decisions or considering what the residents had to contribute.  
                                                 
10 Helen Zille – Premier of the Western Cape Province 




I note that Steyn12 disingenuously omits reference to this quotation in his affidavit. 
Furthermore, he makes no mention of our attempts in this regard to cooperate and work with 
the City in order to find an amicable solution (Lili Aff., 2010:5:12). 
 
In summary, with the limited data found that could speak directly to this question, it was 
determined that, while the UISP specified certain tasks to local, provincial and national 
government - the programme envisioned cooperative governance between all three spheres to 
be seen and act as one body. Data from the stakeholder groups showed that the provincial 
government denied any participation of the decision the City made to install unenclosed toilets 
and stated that they were never informed of the decision made to do so.  
  
                                                 




5.2.3 Sources of knowledge  
The questions asked when dealing with the expertise in an SOI as per Ulrich’s framework 
are: 
7. Who is (ought to be) considered a professional or expert?  
8. What kind of expertise is (ought to be) consulted? 
9. What/who is (ought to be) assumed to be the guarantor of success? 
These questions are to establish where the provision of competent expertise to successfully 
execute the project comes from, and also to determine what the factors are to determine this 
successful execution. 
QUESTION 7 
Who ought to be considered a professional or expert? That is, who should be involved 
as competent provider of knowledge, experience and expertise? 
UISP 
• Engineering consultants/Construction professionals 
• Community 
• Community leaders  
• Municipality  
• Provincial department  
• National department  
• Community facilitator/Conflict resolver  
Project 
Documentation 
• Liebenberg and Stander 
• KV3 Consulting Engineers 
• Umzamo Civils 
• Shamrock Plumbing  
• CoCT 
• Department of the Western Province  
• Residents 






Who is considered a professional or further expert? That is, who is involved as a 
competent provider of knowledge, experience and expertise? 
Residents and 
Community Leaders 
Residents and community leaders believed that only the City of Cape Town 
were regarded as the experts in the actual scenario. They believed they had 
expertise to share regarding contextual knowledge but that it was 
undermined by the City. 
CoCT 
Experts stated as per project documentation 
Consultants Experts stated as per project documentation 
 
The UISP states that the upgrading projects ought to involve several experts. These types of 
experts can be grouped into four categories, namely technical, financial, legislative and social 
experts.  
Engineering consultants, construction contractors and municipalities were seen as being experts 
in the technical field. For Project Silvertown, these experts were Liebenberg and Stander, KV3 
Consulting Engineers, the civil contractors (Shamrock Plumbing and Mzamo Civils) as well as 
the City of Cape Town. Financial expertise and responsibility were primarily assigned to the 
provincial department as well as the City. While all three spheres of government were expected 
to be well versed regarding the legislation in the UISP, primary responsibility of this task and 
interpretation of legislation were given to the national government. Members of the community 
as well as community facilitators and community leaders were seen to be experts in the 
contextual knowledge required for the success of upgrading projects.  
 
Secondly, the community has deep routed knowledge of its development needs and preferences. 
This knowledge must be harnessed to ensure that a township design and services standards as 
well as the housing solutions and the economic and social facilities opted for, are targeted at 
satisfying the actual needs and preferences (DHS, 2009:30). 
 
However, in the actual scenario, residents and community leaders believed that they were not 




experts was filled by the CoCT. They believed they tried to position themselves as experts in 
matters relating to the contextual issues in the project, and even tried to find solutions to some 
technical and financial issues. Despite their efforts, they believed that their inputs were not taken 
seriously or considered by the CoCT.  
On this topic, Andile Lili, one of the community leaders and political figures residing in the 
area, had this to say: 
The City did not inform us that it planned to install the enclosures on that day; consider our 
reasonable and easily implementable proposal for an alternative structure; seek to find a 
solution to the problem with which we are comfortable (Lili Answering Aff., 2010:5:14). 
 
The CoCT and consultants believed they had made every effort possible to engage with the 
community and gain their knowledge and expertise. From the data recorded from these 
stakeholders, it appeared that when professional expertise was being discussed and decisions 
made, the CoCT and consultants took into consideration the expertise or requests of the 
community members.  
Data showed that when the consultants and CoCT experts discussed matters, it seemed as 
though they only took accounts of the information given by the social experts. Extracts from 
data shown below indicate that social experts did not seem to be at the table when issues relating 
to the required project expertise were discussed.  
Steyn13 stated that during his interview that it was necessary to discuss the demands of the 
community with the relevant role players to search for an alternative. Steyn informed us that 
the project team had a discussion and the proposed alternative was the "loo with a view" as 
successfully implemented previously in other areas in the City, such as Phillipi (Forensic 
Services Department, 2010:14;628). 
 
                                                 




The decision was then taken that Mzomba14 would discuss the matter with KV3 Engineers15 
and Bergstan SA16 to search for alternatives.  On the 30th of November 2007 a meeting was 
held on the 21st Floor, Civic Centre between himself, Mzomba (City), A Bishop17, G 
Honeyman18 and N Caso of Bergstan SA where the financial status and technical detail were 
discussed (Forensic Services Department, 2010:15;629). 
 
To summarise, the UISP mentioned experts in four different categories, namely technical, 
financial, social and legislative experts. The role of the social expert was of the biggest concern 
in Project Silvertown. On this, the UISP stated the importance of involving the community as 
experts to provide contextual knowledge required for the upgrading process. However, in the 
project, the residents and community leaders felt as though they were not recognised as experts 
despite their efforts to engage and contribute their knowledge with the City and consultants. 
This aggravated tensions between the City and the residents and community leaders, and 
contributed to the violent protests which occurred. 
  
                                                 
14 Mr J Mzomba – Erstwhile City of Cape Town Manager: New Housing 
15 A Bishop – Ward Councilor Bergstan SA Consulting and Development Engineers 
16 G Honeyman - Bergstan SA Consulting and Development Engineers 







What kind of expertise ought to be consulted? That is, what should count as relevant 
knowledge? 
UISP 
• Technical considerations: local municipality governed by National 
Housing Code 
• Financial considerations: MEC approved based on how 
municipality stated it would apportion the funds 
• Social considerations: residents 
• Legislative conditions: national and local government 
Project Documentation Technical, financial and social expertise 
  
What kind of expertise is consulted? That is, what counts as relevant knowledge?  
Residents Financial 
CoCT Technical, financial and social expertise 
Consultants Technical, financial and social expertise 
Community Leaders Financial 
 
On the question of what kind of expertise is required for upgrading of informal settlements, 
similar to Question 7, the UISP and project documentation consider four categories of expertise 
for the success of a project, namely technical, financial, social and legislative expertise.  
Community needs must be balanced with community preferences, affordability indicators and 
sound engineering practice (DHS, 2009:14). 
 
An appropriate and sustainable trade-off should be reached between up-front capital costs, 
long-term maintenance and operating costs, settlement affordability levels, the need for 
environmental sustainability, social acceptability, human dignity and safety (DHS, 2009:37).  
 
The purpose of this submission is to obtain approval to initiate Phase 1, 2 & 3 of the Silvertown 
Housing Development in terms of the National Housing Programme: Upgrading of Informal 





The UISP assigns the oversight and approval of matters relating to technical expertise to the 
local municipality. However, the execution of technical tasks is the main responsibility of 
external professionals such as town planners, consulting engineers, as well as the building 
contractors, as mentioned in Question 7. Some of the technical expertise mentioned relates to 
geotechnical investigations, land surveys, municipal engineering designs etc. 
The conceptual plan prepared by the planners and the engineers will make provision for various 
options in the development (City of Cape Town, 2005). 
 
The approval of the design and standards of engineering services by the municipality (DHS, 
2009:34). 
 
Financial expertise primarily involved project financing, budgeting and funding allocation. 
While the provincial department is primarily responsible for the project funding and allocation, 
the responsibility of putting together the budget and cash flow breakdown for the project is the 
responsibility of the local municipality – in this instance the CoCT. 
The PDs will be responsible for the funding and implementation of this programme in 
partnership with municipalities (DHS, 2009:21). 
 
The City of Cape Town hereby applies for approval of subsidies for the in-situ upgrading of 
Silvertown … The application is requested in the amount of R6,663,460.00 (City of Cape 
Town, 2004). 
 
On the matter of social expertise, as mentioned in Question 7, the UISP considers the 
involvement of the community as experts regarding their contextual environment. Their 




Entails an area- and/or community-wide focus, fostering holistic development of the settlement 
with minimum disruption of existing fragile community networks and support structures. To 
the greatest extent possible, settlements should be upgraded in a holistic, integrated and locally 
appropriate manner. Engagement between community members and their local authorities is of 
the utmost importance to ensure locally appropriate solutions (DHS, 2009:13). 
 
Furthermore, the UISP states that all upgrading projects make provision in their budget for 
capacitation of the community members to enable them to understand their rights throughout 
this process and to enable them to be in a position to better contribute their expertise with a 
broader knowledge of the project and their constitutional rights.  
The community must be assisted and encouraged to achieve the required level of competency 
for meaningful and realistic participation in all aspects of their development (DHS, 2009:30). 
 
To ensure that the objectives of the community participation are achieved, the programme has 
accordingly been designed to facilitate extensive community capacitation to achieve the 
intended participation. Therefore, in terms of the programme provisions:  
- A municipality may apply for funding for the appointment of capacity to assist in the processes 
leading up to the conclusion of the participation agreement with communities;  
- Facilitation should, as a minimum, include the following tasks: Socio-economic surveying of 
households; Facilitating community participation; Project information sharing and progress 
reporting; Conflict resolution, where applicable; Housing support services comprising: i 
Training and education on housing rights and obligations;               ii Capacity building of 
housing beneficiaries; iii Assistance with the selection of housing options; iv Management of 
building materials; v Relocation assistance (DHS, 2009:31). 
 
However, in the textual data analysed, there was no mention of any community capacitation 
that took place for Project Silvertown. Evidence of the extent to which the community were not 
aware of their rights came to light in the forensic investigation report, which was conducted and 
where members of the community were interviewed. 
In our community, we believe that the reason why the City and the Province built these open 
toilets was because of a housing policy that permits the building of open toilets for poor people 




as it is in conflict with our constitutional rights set out in paragraph 2 of the Notice of Motion. 
I am further advised that such a policy would be a breach of the government's constitutional 
duty under section 7(2) of the Constitution and more particularly to provide us with access to 
adequate housing (Beja Affidavit, 2010:9). 
 
Sondlo19 further stated that they agreed to this offer as they had used the bucket system for the 
past twenty years and were afraid that should they decline the offer they would lose out on the 
opportunity to have their own toilets (Forensic Services Department, 2010:646). 
 
The UISP has given the role of legislative expertise to the national government, making them 
responsible for maintaining all policy relating to the programme, as well as assisting local and 
provincial departments with such interpretation of the programme. However, from what was 
found in the data from representatives from the national department, it appears as though they 
were not aware of the decision to construct unenclosed toilets for Project Silvertown. The break 
in communication between the different spheres of government therefore resulted in national 
government not being able to provide their expertise on legislature, which would have not 
permitted the construction of such toilets. On this matter, Mr Van Der Walt, a representative 
from the national department, had this to say in his affidavit: 
Second and in any event, if the individual facilities provided by the City are found to result in 
an infringement of any constitutional right, they are self-evidently unconstitutional and cannot 
be considered to be "in excess" of any alleged nationally prescribed minimum (Van der Walt 
Answering Aff., 2010:12;16.2). 
 
I have no personal knowledge of the alleged agreement entered into between the City and the 
beneficiary community. I address this issue elsewhere in this affidavit. However, for present 
purposes I reiterate that the Code does allow for the conclusion of agreements with beneficiary 
communities, subject to there being compliance with its requirements (Van der Walt Answering 
Aff., 2010:12;17). 
                                                 





In summary, four types of expertise were seen to be relevant for Project Silvertown, namely 
technical, financial, social and legislative expertise. Although the UISP mandated the capitation 
of the community members to allow them to contribute their knowledge and fully understand 
their housing rights, no evidence of this training was found for Project Silvertown.  
The quotes from members of the community suggested that the residents’ lack of expertise 
regarding the other aspects of the project rendered them vulnerable to what the technical, 
legislative and financial experts were telling them. They believed it was lawful for the City to 
construct unenclosed toilets for residents and that, if they did not accept the compromise of 
open toilets, they would not be able to get any toilets owing to funding constraints.  
Furthermore, there appeared to be a lack of communication between the three spheres of 
government, particularly relating to the City, not informing provincial and national government 
of the scope change and decision to move ahead with the construction of unenclosed toilets. 
This lack of communication resulted in legislative expertise (which fell under national 
government’s domain) not adequately being considered when the decision was taken to 
construct open toilets. This inadvertently weakened the importance of the contextual knowledge 
which the community members had and placed technical and financial expertise as the 





What or who ought to be assumed to be the guarantor of success? That is, where should 
those involved seek some guarantee that improvement will be achieved for example, 
consensus among experts, the involvement of stakeholders, the experience and intuition 
of those involved, political support?  
UISP 
Prior to construction, agreements between local and provincial 
government, as well as agreements between local government and 
the community must be signed. In addition, once the upgrades are 
completed a beneficiary satisfaction survey is required to determine 
the impact of the development on residents’ lives. 
Project Documentation 
 Guarantee of success through the involvement of stakeholders in 
the Project Steering Committee.   
What or who is assumed to be the guarantor of success? That is, where do those involved 
seek some guarantee that improvement will be achieved? For example, consensus 
among experts, the involvement of stakeholders, the experience and intuition of those 
involved, political support.  
  
Residents Consensus among technical and financial experts 
CoCT Consensus among municipality and residents – “happy letters” 
Consultants Consensus among residents, technical and financial experts, and 
municipality 
Community Leaders Consensus among technical and financial experts 
 
To improve the likelihood of success of upgrading projects, the UISP requires that a consensus 
among experts be sought between the local municipality, the provincial department and 
community. Prior to construction starting, evidence of this consensus is to be produced in the 
form of two formal agreements. The first agreement is an agreement between the local 
municipality and the provincial department. As per the UISP, the agreement between the 
municipality and provincial department should, at minimum, contain the following information 




• A clear description of the approved project and approval registration number;  
• Conditions imposed by the MEC when approving the project;  
• A clear indication of how the membership of the parties to the agreement is structured, who 
is represented by each party, and in terms of what mandate. Provision may also be made for the 
co-option of members, for "non-voting" members, for observers and for the attendance by 
invitation of consultants;  
• Procurement requirements;  
• Total number of persons/households to be assisted under the project; 
• Detailed description of the land on which the project will be implemented;  
• The approved project specifics in respect of the following: - Envisaged planning of the area; 
- The agreed professional services to be procured, details on the work to be done, and fees to 
be paid;  
- The tenure rights to be awarded under Phases 1 to 3 of the project;  
- The planning details of the township indicating layout, land use, sizes of stands and intended 
zoning of stands;  
- The details on the interim municipal engineering services to be provided, if applicable;  
- The details of the permanent municipal engineering services to be provided;  
- The type of permanent housing solutions selected for Phase 4 of the development.  
• Details of any other assistance to be provided;  
• A detailed itemised breakdown of all amounts of the grant and the total grant amount;  
• Details of the contracting strategy selected;  
• Details of community participation plan and confirmation of the commitment to implement 
the agreement reached with the community;  
• The amount of the grant approved under the programme, which will be discounted against 
subsequent housing subsidies to the extent to which it contributes materially to the future 
permanent housing solution for the beneficiaries of the programme;  
• A detailed project implementation plan also indicating the cash flow, agreed project 
milestones and progress payments;  
• Rental and/or occupational compensation to be charged for Phases 1 to 3;  
• Provision of assistance to indigent persons;  
• Details on any other agreed housing goods or services to be provided and/or procured;  
• Any other matters deemed reasonable and necessary to ensure that the project objectives are 
met;  




- When, where and how often the parties will meet;  
- The description of the quorum for a constituted meeting;  
- The process of appointment of a chairperson and secretary and their terms of office;  
- The responsibility regarding secretarial functions;  
- The manner in which decisions will be made; and  
- How conflicts will be resolved and procedures to be followed, should the agreement be 
terminated.  
• Signatures of members to indicate acceptance of the terms of contract. The date and place of 
signature should be included (DHS, 2009:58). 
 
As can be seen, the requirements stated for this agreement are robust and elaborately detailed 
in the UISP to allow for clarity on what is required in the agreement. For Project Silvertown it 
appears that an agreement was signed between the CoCT and the Western Cape Department of 
Local Government and Housing because, when the Project Silvertown application was 
approved, Mr Muller from the Western Cape Provincial Department sent a letter to Mr Steyn 
from the CoCT, stating the need for this agreement to be signed to commence forward with the 
project.  
While the agreement did not form part of the data sourced, as it could not be found on record in 
the High Court documents, it was assumed that the agreement must have been signed and agreed 
upon by both parties because the project was able to commence. 
As required by the UISP policy, an Agreement between the Department and the Municipality 
will have to be signed in which the obligations of the parties are explained. You are kindly 
requested to provide the Department with an estimated programme and cash flow. This 
programme and cash flow, if acceptable to the Department, will form the basis for agreed 
milestones on which advance payments can be made to the Municipality. The agreed cash flow 
and payment milestones will form a part of the Agreement (City of Cape Town: 2005). 
 
While the agreement between the municipality and the provincial department is clearly defined 
in the UISP, the details on what is required to be in the agreement between the municipality and 




an agreement between the municipality and the community; however, it does not go into detail 
as to what the agreement should include and how it should be structured.  
In order to ensure that community members assume ownership of their own development and 
project, the involvement of the community from the onset is key. Hence, community 
participation should be undertaken within the context of a structured agreement between the 
municipality and the community (DHS, 2009:43). 
 
Once the project has been registered and the funding reservation confirmed by the MEC, the 
municipality will proceed with the implementation of Phase 2 of the project. During this phase 
of the upgrading process, municipalities will receive funding to undertake the following 
activities… The conclusion of an agreement between the municipality and the community on 
the participation process (DHS, 2009:43). 
 
After the upgrades have been completed, the UISP also requests that municipalities conduct a 
beneficiary satisfaction survey to help measure the sustainability of the upgrading project.  
A beneficiary satisfaction survey to determine the impact of the development impact on their 
lives (DHS, 2009:36). 
 
Project Silvertown documentation made mention that ensuring the success of the project was 
through the involvement and support of political and community-based structures within the 
community to form part of the Project Steering Committee.  
The community participation processes commenced in November 2003. The project manager 
and community facilitator approached the political and community based structures in 
Khayelitsha. Role players and organisations that have an active interest in the Silvertown 
project and have a genuine concern that the end result of any development is successful, were 
targeted to form a Steering Committee (CoCT, 2004:5). 
 
In the actual scenario, the City of Cape Town acknowledged that besides providing toilets that 
worked, the guarantee of success of this project would largely involve consensus among the 
stakeholders involved and affected. This consensus took the form of informal agreements, as 




Upon making the decision to build the unenclosed toilets, the City believed it came to an 
informal agreement or understanding with the community representatives. To get formal 
agreement on the success of the project outcome, the City instructed the contractors employed 
to get the residents to sign what they called “happy letters”. These letters were presented to the 
residents to sign after installation of the toilets so as to confirm that they were satisfied with the 
structure handed over.  
To the City, the letters were three things - written proof of the initial verbal agreement made 
between the CoCT and residents for the construction of unenclosed toilets; signed approval of 
the residents’ satisfaction with the completed installation of the toilet structure and finally, a 
fulfilment of the community participation requirements as per the conditions set out in the UISP. 
By signing these letters, the City believed it indicated that the residents were happy with the 
structures upon receipt, save for less than five beneficiaries who disapproved.  
Owing to the largely positive responses from the letters, the City and consultants believed that 
they had successfully completed their scope of work. The remaining task of enclosing each of 
the toilets was up to the residents to do themselves.  
He also stated that in order to obtain the satisfaction of the community each beneficiary had to 
sign a letter ("happy letter", a term used by consultants with us) after completion of structure. 
The "happy letters" did not indicate that the community is dissatisfied with the project (Forensic 
Services Department, 2010: 16:631). 
 
The importance of providing the completed Happy Letters had been addressed to Shamrock 
Plumbing. The Contractor had been made aware that the project could not be certified as 
complete without the abovementioned completed Happy Letters (KV3 Engineers, 2009a: 
2:4.6). 
 
However, the majority of residents stated that they had signed the letters under false pretences 
from the City. From what can be seen residents were not equipped with adequate knowledge of 
their human rights, housing policy and particulars of the Silvertown Project to have been able 




the residents felt as though the City had manipulated their lack of knowledge to allow them to 
accept the building of unenclosed toilets. 
I also informed the community that we had been misled into accepting the construction of open 
toilets in the area. We informed the community that no budget existed for the construction of 
housing, which would integrate the open toilet and thereby provide enclosure for them (Lili 
Supporting Aff., 2010:4:9). 
 
There is no indication or evidence that the City made any attempt to explain what the 
implications of any agreement was or were, whether there were any options available to the 
community, or questions as to the affordability of enclosing their own individual toilets, what 
materials were to be used, whether there was going to be any assistance, or for how long the 
toilets were to be enclosed on a temporary basis (Arendse, Masuku & Sidaki, 2011: 16:28.7). 
 
Their assumption was that the installation of the unenclosed toilets was a partial fulfilment of 
what the City had promised them – their own houses into which the unenclosed toilets would 
be incorporated. Although they could not discount the evidence of the signed agreements, 
residents contested the conditions under which these agreements were signed. To them, the 
guarantee of success for the project ought to have been the construction of houses. The letters 
they signed were in agreement of temporarily accepting the unenclosed structures for three 
months until they would be enclosed by their new homes.  
I recall that the leadership of our community informed us at some point prior to the open toilets 
being provided that the toilets were a step to the immediate provision of housing. I recall that 
we were told that these open toilets had to be built in such a manner so as to incorporate them 
into a housing structure. I also remember being told that the housing project in our area would 
be built within three months of the open toilets being built. I can state that when I signed a piece 
of paper with some people who told me that they were from the City of Cape Town I did not 
understand the open toilets to be unlinked to any housing project. I have spoken to other 
members of our community and they seem to have understood the issues in the same way - that 
open toilets would be integrated into a house which was going to be built within a period of 3 
months. To the extent that it is alleged that we accepted these open toilets, I point out that is 
was on condition and only on condition that they were part and parcel of a house, which was to 
be constructed on the land within a period of 3 months. I would not have accepted the 





As leaders of the community, we agreed to have these open toilets constructed only on condition 
that they were part and parcel of a housing project which was to be implemented within three 
months of putting up these open toilets. We then proceeded to persuade the community to 
accept the City's proposal and to support the construction of these toilets. To the community, 
the construction of the open toilets was regarded as a phase in the construction of a house. It 
was never accepted as a permanent feature and even though some community members 
enclosed them, it was always on the basis that when the housing project is implemented the 
toilet infrastructure would be integrated into the housing structure (Lili Supporting Aff., 3:6). 
 
In summary, the UISP requires a signed agreement prior to the construction stage, namely a 
signed agreement between the municipality and provincial department, and a signed agreement 
between the municipality and the community affected. After the completion of upgrading 
works, a beneficiary satisfaction survey is required to be done between the community and the 
municipality responsible for the upgrading project. Unlike the detailed description of what the 
agreement between the municipality and provincial department should contain, the UISP does 
not go into detail regarding what that agreement between the community and municipality 
should include.  
The City of Cape Town and consultants were able to produce signed agreements in the form of 
“happy letters” signed by all but five households within the community, which they believed 
constituted an adequate guarantee of project success. However, the residents and community 
leaders believed that, even though they signed off on the completed construction of open toilets, 
it was under false pretences. They were under the impression they would be provided with 
housing three months after the toilet installation, a measure which they deemed to be the 





5.2.4 Sources of legitimation 
Ulrich stresses the importance of sources of legitimacy in any social planning effort, as it 
serves as a reminder to the parties involved of the “moral responsibility for all the practical 
consequences of their planning effort” (Ulrich, 1983:10). To determine where legitimacy lies 
within the system, Ulrich proposes the following three questions be asked:  
10. Who is (ought to be) witness to the interests of those affected but not involved? 
That is, who is (should be) treated as a legitimate stakeholder, and who argues 
(should argue) the case of those stakeholders who cannot speak for themselves, 
including future generations and non-human nature? 
11. What ought to be/are the opportunities for the interests of those negatively affected 
to have expression and freedom from the worldview of the system? That is, where 
does (should) legitimacy lie? 
12. What worldview is (ought to be) determining? That is, what different visions of 















Who ought to be witness to the interests of those affected but not involved? That is, who 
should be treated as a legitimate stakeholder, and who should argue the case of those 
stakeholders who cannot speak for themselves, including future generations and non-
human nature?  
UISP Ward committee members, community participation facilitators 
Project Documentation 
Khayelitsha Development Forum, SANCO, community Liaison 
consultant 
  
Who is witness to the interests of those affected but not involved? That is, who is treated 
as a legitimate stakeholder, and who argues the case of those stakeholders who cannot 
speak for themselves, including future generations and non-human nature?  
Residents 
Initially KDF and SANCO served as witnesses but when they left 
the project, residents consulted with ward councillors. Some 
members also approached the ANCYL and the rest of the 
community who were not in favour of this were forced to have 
them as representatives. 
CoCT and Consultants 
The witnesses ought to have been the KDF and SANCO. They 
were elected representatives by the community. Upon the Project 
Steering Committee dissolving, the ward councillors ended up 
being the community representatives. 
Community Leaders Community liaison officers, ANCYL and ward councillors 
 
While the UISP advocates for the involvement of all community members throughout the 
duration of the project, it also recognises that residents of informal settlements are considered 
to be vulnerable groups owing to the likelihood of them being disadvantaged, either 
educationally, economically or physically. Thus, the programme advocates for community 
participation to be run through ward committees with ward committee members facilitating the 
participation processes. Ward committees play an important role in the government’s ambitions 
for a people-centred democracy, as they serve as the link between the local ward councillor and 




Ulrich states the importance of allowing only those affected by the outcome of the project to 
elect who they want to represent them (Achterkamp & Vos, 2007). Ward committee members 
are elected by the local residents with the ward committee being recognised by municipalities 
as the legitimate statutory structure to consult with for all matters relating to the ward (SA News, 
2016). 
Community participation should be undertaken through Ward Committees with ongoing effort 
in promoting and ensuring the inclusion of key stakeholders and vulnerable groups in the 
process (DHS, 2009:15). 
 
The programme also recommends the use of external community participation facilitators to 
provide any education or advice to community members, should this be required. 
The appointment of external capacity to provide consumer education and construction advice 
and material management over and above the functions that will be fulfilled by surveyors and 
community participation facilitators, may be considered (DHS, 2009:31). 
 
For Project Silvertown, the project documentation made no mention of ward committee 
members. Regarding community representatives, it stated that SANCO and KDF, two NGO 
representatives, were elected by the residents to sit on the Project Steering Committee. Ward 
councillors were also members of the PSC; however, they were considered to be representatives 
of the council and not the beneficiary communities.  
The Committee consisted of the following members:  
a. Representatives of the Council:  
i. The Executive Councillor Housing, normally represented by an official from Housing, 
Mr G Wiseman  
ii. The affected ward councillor : Cllr Kula  
iii. The affected proportional councillor: Cllr Ncedana  
iv. The Director Public Housing, normally represented by the project manager, Mr A 
Bishop  





i.  Two from SANCO  
ii. Two from the Ward/(Khayelitsha) Development Forum (WDF/KDF) 
 
SANCO and KDF’s involvement in the project began in 2003. However, at the start of the 
construction phase in 2005 the Project Steering Committee meetings were replaced by more 
regular site meetings. The PSC eventually dissolved and the involvement of SANCO and the 
KDF in the project stopped altogether. While records mention the dissolution of the PSC to the 
addition of the site meetings, other members believe that their involvement in the project and 
the collapse of the committee might have stopped due to political tensions. 
Meetings of the steering committee continued throughout the planning phase of the Silvertown 
project in 2004 and 2005. At a meeting on 29 August 2005, the contractors appointed by the 
City for the project were introduced. In the implementation phase of the project the meetings 
of the steering committee were superseded by regular site meetings between the engineers and 
community representatives (Caso Affidavit, 4:10). 
 
According to Wiseman, negative influences and political interference resulted in the steering 
committee becoming dormant. On questioning him about the nature of the political 
interference, he could not provide names or further details in this regard (Forensic Services 
Department, 2010: 21:709). 
 
With the dissolution of the PSC shortly into the project commencement, the consultants and 
CoCT believed that the residents decided to communicate directly with their ward councillors 
as their representatives.   
Mr N Caso of Bergstan SA stated in his interview on the 7th of April 2010 that a steering 
committee was formed wherein the role players of various disciplines would participate. The 
steering committee was later abandoned and the community decided to deal directly with the 
respective ward councillors on the issue of the construction of the toilets (Forensic Services 
Department, 2010: 17:636).  
 
Data suggests that there seemed to be disagreements among the ward councillors on the decision 




they, as well as the residents were in favour of the decision to construct the open toilets, it 
seemed as though Councillor Mkutswana (also known as Councillor Rhyder) was not in favour 
of the decision and had requested, to no avail, that enclosures be built for the residents. 
Although the UISP required that the municipality “must demonstrate effective interactive 
community participation” (UISP, 2009:15), it appeared that when the matter of SANCO and 
KDF no longer attending the site meetings as community representatives had been addressed to 
the CoCT, they did not take any actions to remedy the situation or find alternative 
representatives to speak on behalf of the residents. 
A matter of concern had been raised about SANCO members not attending the monthly CLO 
meetings, as they form the platform for issues to be raised by councillors or the community. 
The Client stated that the forum had been made available for community related issues to be 
addressed, in which case they would not be held accountable for matters that had not reached 
the forum, due to lack of attendance from SANCO members. No apologies had been received 
for the above rnentioned, and it is reiterated that it forms part of the CLO's responsibility to 
inform SANCO members of meetings which is to take place (KV3 Engineers, 2009c: 2:3.2.3). 
 
Another interesting role-players who took on the role of being the link between the project team 
and the residents when construction began, were the community liaison officers (CLOs). They 
were hired by the project contractors under the following directive: 
The CLO to be extension of the contractor who is employed by the Contractor and has the 
Contractor's interest at heart. Roles of the CLO's: Communications between community and 
contractor; Identification of local labour for the contract; Placement of structures, positions 
(KV3 Engineers, 2009c: 2:4.2.3). 
 
While they were not formally elected by the residents and mandated to have the contractor’s 
interests at heart, the CLOs believed themselves to be witnesses to those affected.  
The CLOs were never in favour of open toilets or residents enclosing toilets on their own. That 
is why one will see that there is no written record of it in any of the minutes of meetings held 
with the CLOs. The CLOs took their mandate from, the community and I know that the 





I am an adult male and reside in Makhaza, Khayelitsha. I am duly authorised to depose to this 
affidavit on behalf of the applicants, and on behalf of the residents of Makhaza (Lili Answering 
Aff., 2:1). 
 
However, members of the CoCT and consultants later on in the project questioned the conduct 
and interests of the CLOs – particularly that of Mr Andile Lili, as he was also an active member 
on the leadership of the ANCYL.  
These meetings were attended by "community liaison officers" ("CLOs"), who were members 
of the community who were paid to attend meetings and to represent the community's concerns. 
Mr. Andile Lili was one of these CLOs had attended some meetings (although he often failed 
to attend meetings without excuse) (Caso Affidavit, 4:11). 
 
The ANCYL’s involvement became prominent upon the residents’ realisation that there was no 
plan to enclose the toilets by the government or provide the formal housing they had promised. 
It appeared they had support of some of the community members, as the complaint to the 
SAHRC and application lodged to the South African High Court was done together with Mrs 
Beja, the resident who was stabbed.  
Following my attack, the community of Makhaza, supported by the Youth League of the 
African National Congress, decided to formally report the issue of open toilets to the South 
African Human Rights Commission (Beja Founding Aff., 4:11). 
 
The CoCT questioned that the Youth League had the best interests of the residents at heart 
because City officials claimed that they had come to an agreement with the owners of the 55 
unenclosed toilets to enclose the facilities with a corrugated iron structure. However, Mr Lili 
and members of the ANCYL purposefully sabotaged all attempts made by the City several times 
to further their political ambitions. 
When the City realised that the 55 toilets remained unenclosed (being 4.1% of the individual 




families being unable to afford materials to enclose their individual toilets, it (i.e. the City) 
attempted on at least three occasions to construct enclosures out of corrugated, galvanised iron 
and timber. This was generally welcomed by the affected beneficiaries, but opposed by the 
representatives of the ANCYL (after they initially supported it). Enclosures constructed by the 
City out of corrugated, galvanised iron and timber were violently and wantonly destroyed by a 
small, uncontrolled group of ANCYL members (Fairbridges Attorneys, 2011). 
 
 The ANCYL organised and sanctioned the vandalising of the enclosures, which made it 
necessary for the City to temporarily remove the toilets until enclosures could be erected 
sustainably. As to the claim of Mr Lili to represent the community of Makhaza, I do not accept 
that this is the case. Whatever interest Mr Lili serves, I strongly doubt that the community he 
claims to represent has anything to do with it. I also do not recall Mr Lili, in his capacity as the 
remunerated liaison officer on the project, reporting any problems with regard to unenclosed 
toilets, notwithstanding that it was his duty to do so (Zille Answering Aff., 20:46). 
 
To conclude, the elected witnesses who were meant to represent the interests of those affected 
were the ward councillors, Sanco and KDF. However, circumstances occurred which resulted 
in SANCO and KDF’s involvement in the project stopping – leaving the ward councillors as 
the solely elected representatives of the residents in the area, who themselves did not seem to 
share a unified stance. Other groups such as the CLOs and the ANCYL claimed to be additional 
witnesses for the residents and having their best interests at heart. However, the motives behind 





What ought to be the opportunities for the interests of those negatively affected to have 
expression and freedom from the worldview of the system? That is, where should 
legitimacy lie?  
UISP 
Professional appointed for conflict resolution and capacitation of 
skills. This is to ensure residents understand their housing rights, 
obligations and involvement through all aspects of the development, 
and are able to voice their opinion on any matter relating to this from 
a more informed point of view. 
Project Documentation 
Concerns were raised through the Project Steering Committee and a 
dispute resolution committee. 
  
What are the opportunities for the interests of those negatively affected to have 
expression and freedom from the worldview of the system? That is, where does 
legitimacy lie?  
Residents 
Inadequate opportunities were available for freedom of expression 
and lack of understanding of the policy and project phases. 
Therefore, residents resorted to strike action to have their voices 
heard. 
CoCT and Consultants 
Platforms given at community meetings, the ability to raise concerns 
to ward councillors and community leaders, as well as the door to 
door consultations where "happy letters" were being signed existed. 
Community Leaders 
Community leaders and residents were not heard in the formalised 
avenues for consultation. Once those formal structures of 
communication (PSC) were dissolved, they decided to organise 
strike action.  
 
The UISP attempted to provide several vehicles that would allow for freedom of expression for 
the residents. Firstly, the UISP mandated community capacitation in upgrading projects to 
ensure that beneficiaries were able to speak and raise concerns from an informed position. 
Secondly, the UISP suggested the need for municipalities to employ a professional to deal with 




stressed the need for the community to be involved and engaged actively in all aspects of the 
development.  
Project documentation highlighted that PSC meetings and site meetings were held where 
SANCO and the KDF, representatives of the community, could voice any opinions they might 
have had. Furthermore, they formed a dispute resolution committee to help deal with any 
problems they might encounter.  
The PSC has instituted a dispute resolution committee. This committee has already dealt with 
a variety of issues. The committee reports to the PSC and is chaired by the project community 
liaison consultant who is external to the community, and can take an unbiased stance on issues 
in the interests of the whole community (CoCT, 2004:5). 
 
In both the City and consultants’ opinion they had done due diligence trying to engage with the 
public and providing several platforms for them to raise their concerns. The CoCT believed that 
they had made available the avenues for community members and their representatives to 
openly engage with them. They held PSC meetings, regular site meetings in town halls, which 
involved both community representatives, as well as community members. In addition to 
providing consulting engineering services, the CoCT also employed Bergstan to facilitate 
community participation and consultation to the affected beneficiaries of the project. They 
believed that what affected the residents’ freedom of expression was not the inability of the 
residents to engage with officials – it was the involvement of the ANCYL. 
One of the key responsibilities allocated to Bergstan was to facilitate community participation 
and consultation processes with the affected beneficiaries of this project. I was directly involved 
in and responsible for facilitating these consultative processes (Caso Aff., 2010:2:3). 
 
Indeed, the City has, in my view, extended the parameters of the Code further than most, if not 
all other local authorities, by actively engaging with its informal settlement communities so as 





What is happening now is that the Youth League is taking decisions on the part of the 
community without the community having any say in it. 
 
Regarding the decision of providing unenclosed toilets, the CoCT did not receive any 
complaints from the residents. In defence of this viewpoint, the City contested that they 
followed the procedures as set out by the UISP and if fault needs to be placed, then it should be 
placed on the UISP, which does not cater for vulnerable groups. However, they do acknowledge 
that the emancipation of marginalized groups, such as those with disabilities, were not 
adequately catered for during the project and accept their shortcomings in this area.  
As dealt with below, no-one from the Makhaza area ever raised a concern with the City that 
they were simply unable to afford an enclosure for their toilets. That being said, the City accepts 
that it should in future ensure that an agreement with a community caters for those individuals 
whose personal circumstances demand additional consideration (whether it be on account of 
their age, disability, health, gender or penury) (Plato Replying Aff., 13:29.4). 
 
On the matter of the unenclosed toilets, the community leaders stated that the City’s efforts to 
engage and provide for the residents’ freedom to voice their opinion were not honest. This was 
because less than 5% of the community was represented when the decision was taken to build 
open toilets.  
The 60 people whom Caso claims attended the meeting could not have fairly represented the 
community making up the entire Silvertown project. In the event that these 60 people 
represented 60 households then they would have constituted some 4,6% of the population of 
Silvertown (Forensic Services Department, 2010:7:22). 
 
The residents, however, felt that there were several reasons that were affecting their freedom of 
expression against the unenclosed toilets. The first concern was that if they raised their 
disagreement with the decision taken to construct the unenclosed toilets, they would stand the 
risk of the City not constructing any toilets at all. They did not want to continue to make use of 
communal toilets or the “bucket system” – an undignified method of using a bucket to relieve 




SondIo further stated that they agreed to this offer as they had used the bucket system for the 
past twenty years and were afraid that should they declined the offer they would lose out on the 
opportunity to have their own toilets (Forensic Services Department, 2010: 19:646). 
 
The community accepted the offer of a "loo with a view" as they had made use of the "bucket 
system" for the past twenty years and they were concerned that should they not agree with the 
"loo with a view" they would be left with the "bucket system" of sanitation (Forensic Services 
Department, 2010: 21:710).  
 
The second factor affecting their freedom of expression was the political tension which existed 
between the DA, CoCT and the ANCYL members within the community. Because the 
conditions of these participatory processes did not provide an open environment to express 
themselves, the residents eventually turned to the South African courts to seek justice and air 
their grievances.  
It is also very difficult to discern the individual feelings of the members of the community as 
this matter has been highly politicized and, as a result thereof, people are not at will to air their 
feelings as they fear reprisals (Sokabo20 Aff., 3:14). 
 
“It was humiliating to use the toilet when people see you. There is covering now, but look at 
this (destruction). It is not what I want." Resident Phillip Bayapeli and his wife tried in vain to 
save their enclosure, but were told the community had rejected the corrugated enclosures and 
wanted concrete ones (Cape Times, 2010). 
 
I would be happy for the Court to intervene and to depoliticize our suffering and deprivation of 
our constitutional rights (Beja Founding Aff., 4:13). 
 
In summary, the City and consultants were of the opinion that they set up multiple platforms 
for the residents to voice their opinions throughout all stages of the project and met the 
                                                 




requirements to demonstrate active community engagement in Project Silvertown. However, 
the residents themselves felt as though they could not freely voice their concerns owing to fear 
of not receiving any toilets whatsoever, as well as political tensions. This resulted in them 





What worldview ought to be determining? That is, what different visions of 
improvement should be considered, and how should they be reconciled? 
UISP 
A balanced worldview bettering the living conditions and social 
environment of the residents while also valuing financial and 
technical considerations 
Project Documentation As per the UISP 
  
What worldview is determining? That is, what different visions of improvement are 
considered, and how are they reconciled? 
Residents and Community 
Leaders 
The determining worldview places greater emphasis on 
economic/financial considerations, disregarding the improved 
quality of life, health and safety of the residents.  
CoCT 
The City intended a balanced worldview but were cognisant of the 
financial limitations of the project, and believed opportunists 
positioned this matter to be politically and racially motivated to 
discredit the local ruling political party. 
Consultants 
A balanced worldview bettering the living conditions and social 
environment of the residents while also valuing financial and 
technical considerations 
 
The overarching goal of the UISP values was the improvement in the living conditions of 
informal settlement residents through indicators such as health, safety, access to municipal 
services, tenure, as well as social and economic capital. It aimed to implement this goal through 
a balanced worldview which considered factors such as the needs and preferences of the 
community, affordability indicators, as well as sound technical practice. Therefore, it 
considered the possible worldviews of all parties who might be involved in the upgrading 
project without allowing a particular worldview to dominate.  
Community needs must be balanced with community preferences, affordability indicators and 





Improvements in living conditions measured through: - Health indicators (particularly decline 
in waterborne diseases and infant mortality rates, where these indicators have been recorded 
and are available); - Access to water and sanitation (households having access to “improved” 
drinking water and sanitation; - Tenure (number of households with secure tenure); - Economic 
activity (increased number of business opportunities and number of temporary and permanent 
jobs created); - Social amenities (increased number and affordability of social and recreational 
facilities); - Social capital (particularly family stability and community cohesion); and - Decline 
in crime (crime statistics) (DHS, 2009:35). 
 
The City of Cape Town and consultants believed their worldview was in line with that of the 
UISP, being a balance between the social, technical and economic factors. In their opinion, they 
tried to provide the best possible people-centred solution, given the limitations of finances, as 
well as protocols they needed to adhere to as per the UISP.  
The agreement which the City concluded with the representatives of the Makhaza community 
in respect of the installation of individual toilets on 25 November 2007, as set out in my review 
affidavit, not only promoted the policy imperatives for constitutionally adherent human 
settlements but was, the City submits, an innovative and people-centred approach contrary to 
the assertions made by the Applicants in this regard (Plato Aff., 7:14). 
 
The City would much rather provide individual toilets for each erf. It is on this basis that the 
City's officials went out of their way to find a creative solution to ensure individual toilets. This 
good deed should not be punished (Plato Replying Aff., 78:26). 
 
In the period between the completion of the first three phases of an upgrade and the fourth, 
beneficiaries are expected to build their own houses. No provision is made in this period to 
assist those who genuinely cannot afford to build a house, save for relatively meagre assistance 
in the relocation process. If the City failed to take account of those who could not afford to 
build their own toilet enclosures, then by the same logic the Code must also be deficient to the 
extent that it fails to provide assistance to those who genuinely cannot build their own houses 
(until funding for a permanent house is forthcoming) (Plato Replying Aff., 13:29.1). 
 
The contrast between the actual worldview adopted by the City and the consultants and the 
actual worldview adopted by the residents and community leaders was stark. Residents and 




and considerations incorporating a social worldview were not prioritised. Furthermore, they felt 
discriminated against by the City due to the fact that they were a predominantly black 
community and poor. 
The issue of open toilets in Makhaza has shown that the Premier of the Western Cape and the 
Mayor of the City of Cape Town are unashamed to perpetuate the discrimination of African 
communities. When Africans complain that the Western Cape government institutions under 
the current Premier and Mayor treat Africans in a manner that is racist, they are ridiculed as 
playing the race card (Lili Supporting Aff., 2:3). 
 
The issue of open toilet has demonstrated that poor African people are never regarded as part 
and parcel of the Western Cape. The resources deployed to alleviate their situation are very 
inferior compared to other project in which coloureds or whites are the main beneficiaries. The 
government in the Western Cape deal with us on the basis that we are from the Eastern Cape 
and therefore not entitled to have a decent toilet or access to adequate housing (Lili Supporting 
Aff., 4:11). 
 
In summary, in the ideal state, the USIP has adopted a worldview considering social, technical 
and financial factors, with the overall objective being to holistically improve the lives of the 
residents affected by the upgrading project. Both the City of Cape Town and the consultants 
involved in Project Silvertown believed they were in alignment to the worldview stated under 
the UISP. The opinions of the residents and community leaders of what the actual worldview 
was, differed greatly from that idealised by the UISP. The residents and community leaders 
believed that overall economic motives dominated throughout this project with little attention 





6  Discussion  
The aim of this study was to determine how the comparative perceptions of stakeholders in 
public infrastructure projects affected the success of participatory infrastructure upgrades. The 
study asked two main research questions, namely:  
• What are the differences in perceptions and expectations between stakeholders in a 
participatory upgrade?  
• What implications do the different perceptions and expectations of various stakeholders 
have on the success of participatory upgrades of informal settlements?  
This chapter is split into three sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter discusses five major 
disjunctions identified in the findings from the CSH analysis. The second sub-chapter uses 
existing community participation conceptual frameworks to critique the disjunctions found in 
practice through a theoretical lens. The third sub-chapter discusses how CSH has contributed to 
a structured analysis of data, as well as the limitations brought about by the modified application 
of CSH.   
6.1 Disjunctions between stakeholder perceptions and expectations and 
the associated implications 
Each section under this sub-heading discusses a key disjunction identified in the findings from 
the CSH analysis, and then explains the implication this disjuncture has on the success of 
participatory upgrades.  
6.1.1 Different expectations of community participation and decision- 
making 
This research revealed that one of the major reasons why community participation had failed 
was because the stakeholder groups did not share a common understanding of what community 
participation was meant to achieve, and how it would affect decision-making powers and 
processes. In addition, the UISP policy was found to be ambiguous on what the power-sharing 




State-initiated community participation processes in participatory upgrades are complex to 
manoeuvre due to the power dynamics among stakeholders. Li et al. (2013) and the Public 
Service Commission (2008) claimed that authorities tended to not take community participation 
seriously, and they also found the public were apathetic towards community participation.  
In contrast to their claims, the findings of this study showed that all the stakeholder groups 
involved in the project took community engagement seriously and believed that they had been 
making concerted efforts to ensure the success of the process. This study suggested that the City 
of Cape Town officials took community participation seriously without intentionally trying to 
make it a tick-boxing exercise; rather they viewed and implemented community participation 
differently to what residents and community leaders expected.  
Community leaders were under the impression that community participation was the 
mechanism used for inclusive decision-making with the City. The City believed they followed 
the requirements, as set out by the UISP, to include the community in all aspects of the projects. 
However, what it appeared they did not do (and what the UISP did not explicitly state) was to 
give the community and leaders any decision-making powers through the upgrading process. 
Their engagement processes involved more of a one-way communication style in which the 
City would take into consideration the comments and concerns of the community; however, a 
decision would be reached only between the technical and financial experts, undermining the 
value and power of the community and leaders as social experts.  
An example of this in the data found was how Steyn (a representative of the City) had mentioned 
the importance to take the views of the community into consideration when they were devising 
an alternative sanitation solution to the communal toilets which had been provided. However, 
this comment was made among a group of technical experts with the exclusion of community-
elected representatives at key decision-making meetings. 
These different expectations on decision-making powers and expectations were a cause of 
tension and frustration between the City and community leaders. The City felt they had gone 
above and beyond what was mandated of them in terms of their community engagement efforts. 




suggestions seriously, and they were not able to participate or change any decisions once the 
City and technical experts had made them. 
Examples of the tensions which resulted as a result of different views on community 
participation in Project Silvertown were the multiple incidents of vandalism which occurred 
when the City attempted to enclose the remaining 55 open toilets with corrugated iron. The 
community leaders and residents were not in favour of such enclosures and provided the City 
with alternative solutions such as costing for a brick and mortar enclosure. The City believed 
that they had taken the considerations of the residents into account, but were unable to afford 
brick and mortar enclosures because of financial constraints in the project. The community 
leaders believed the City had not taken their ideas and expertise into consideration, and that the 
City had no intension of working with the community to find a joint solution and decision that 
would please all parties. This showed the different expectations of the role of community 
participation in the decision-making processes. 
The tensions and frustrations brought about by these different stakeholder expectations had 
negative consequences for the relations between the City and residents, thus weakening 
participatory efforts. Unless the expectations of community participation and power-sharing 
agreements had been defined clearly at the onset of the project or emphasised in programme 
documents that the project was premised, such as the UISP, this could compromise the 
community engagement process.  
This view is similar to findings by Maharaj (2012) who found that, between the City of Cape 
Town and Blikkiesdorp community leaders, the different perceptions of what community 
participation was and how it ought to be implemented created tension and disappointment in 
the relationship, and resulted in apathy from the community leaders.  
6.1.2 Differing visions for project outcomes 
Different perspectives among stakeholders are often cited as being a challenge in public 
infrastructure projects involving participatory processes (Olander & Landin, 2005; Quick, 




Silvertown did not share a common vision of what the project was purposed to provide due to 
personal interests and motives.  
For the community leaders and residents, the provision of sanitation services was seen as a 
means to an end – with the end being an improved quality of life. The City and consultants, 
however, viewed the provision of sanitation services as an end in itself. To them, the 
improvement in the quality of life of the residents was a consequence of the Project Silvertown 
upgrades; it was not seen as the main priority. This led to the installation of open toilets, which 
ultimately jeopardised the residents’ quality of life by compromising their safety and removing 
their dignity.  
Although participatory processes were conducted to reveal the differing motivations of both 
these groups as early as 2003, no noted attempts were made to reconcile this conflict in the 
groups’ purpose. Neglecting to address and reconcile the different motivations between 
stakeholder groups jeopardised the potential benefit which participatory processes can play in 
a project. If disagreement is found between groups and no action is taken to find resolutions or 
to reach a consensus it will render the community participation process as futile and frustrate 
those who have participated.  
In the High Court ruling, Judge Erasmus made reference to this aspect by stating that, while the 
City pursued a laudable programme by upgrading the Silvertown informal settlement and 
providing the residents with individual toilets, they lost sight of meeting their needs relating to 
human dignity (WCC, 2012:57:144). This finding was echoed in the works of Quick (2014) and 
Wong, Li and Ng (2012) who explained how stakeholders, particularly citizens, could become 
resentful when their involvement did not seem to influence project outcomes in public 
infrastructure projects. 
6.1.3 Poor capacitation of community members 
The UISP states that capacitation of the community is necessary to help ensure that the 
objectives of community participation are achieved (DHS, 2009). The UISP makes provision 
for capacitation of the community by allocating funds of up to 3% of the total project cost (DHS, 




rights and responsibilities, as well as capacity-building of the beneficiaries (DHS, 2009). 
Findings show that for Project Silvertown, there was poor capacitation of the residents. The 
absence of data pertaining to the City’s capacitation of the Silvertown community, as well as 
findings of how the residents were unaware of their rights as beneficiaries, are evidence of this 
shortcoming.   
The UISP values the role the community plays in the provision of social expertise; however, 
because they were not educated in the aspects pertaining to the other identified forms of 
expertise in the project (technical, financial and legislative), this affected their ability to exercise 
their knowledge contribution effectively. Excerpts of data from the resident group showed that 
they were not aware that the City was infringing on their human rights by providing unenclosed 
toilets. In addition, they did not understand the four-phase approach of the UISP upgrading 
process, and were under the impression that they would be provided with houses three months 
after the installation of the toilets.  
It was under these circumstances that they signed the “happy letters”, which the City presented 
to the court as evidence of a signed agreement between themselves and the community. While 
evidence from the resident group reflected incapacitation of the community, the City believed 
they had educated the residents on the agreement regarding the installation of unenclosed toilets. 
In the Court ruling, Judge Erasmus found that this UISP requirement of community capacitation 
prior to an agreement being signed was not met in Project Silvertown (WCC, 2011:42;98). 
In Chapter 2, it was stated that findings from the DWA (2012) and Public Service Commission 
(2008) revealed that financial, time and human resource constraints were some of the challenges 
which resulted in municipalities not being able to engage communities in a meaningful manner. 
For Project Silvertown neither of these factors were the cause of the CoCT not being able to 
engage with the community in a meaningful manner. As mentioned, a separate budget is 
allocated solely to community capacitation and participation processes. Issues or constraints of 
time were not noted by any of the stakeholders and the City. In the CoCT’s application for the 





Because of this incapacitation, the knowledge or expertise was left in the hands of the City of 
Cape Town and their employed consultants who worked primarily to meet the CoCT’s interests. 
This meant that of all four types of knowledge (technical, financial, social and legislative) and 
their associated experts prescribed by the UISP to be involved for project success, only two of 
the four were met, namely technical and financial expertise, which were mainly under the 
control of the CoCT.  
Ulrich (2011) warns that, in any system of interest, it is important that knowledge or expertise 
be independent of the decision-maker and that over-reliance of one area of expertise be avoided 
to avoid a false guarantee of project success. The consequences, which poor community 
capacitation had on the project were that it rendered them vulnerable to accepting what the 
technical and financial experts were telling them. This disabled them from being able to 
contribute their social expertise from the onset of the project. Instead, only once they understood 
that their toilets were not going to be enclosed and that they were not going to be expecting 
houses in the three months like they believed, did they resort to strike action to enforce their 
expertise.  
In his paper assessing the lack of community participation in UISP projects across South Africa, 
Fieuw (2015) found that most participatory upgrading projects failed to honour capacity 
building or make use of the funding provided for such capacitation. Similar to findings in this 
case study, Fieuw (2015) went on to argue that this lack of capacitation led to the inability to 
functionally integrate the community knowledge and needs into upgrading projects. This could 
result in the formulation of untenable upgrading plans, as well as strained state-community 
relations.  
6.1.4 Disjunction of community representation by legitimate community 
leaders 
Reynolds and Williams (2012) describe how the role of the witness is intended to remove the 
bias that will invariably exist in the assessment of the first three sources of influence, namely 
motivation, power and knowledge. The witness exists in hopes of emancipating the system and 
end-users from activities which may be considered to be coercive or malignant (Reynolds & 




The study found that ad-hoc community representative structures had made the community 
vulnerable to illegitimate community representation and had resulted in the breakdown of 
community-state relations. This illegitimate community representation thwarted participatory 
processes in Project Silvertown. Particularly the issue of unenclosed toilets, into the political 
sphere, resulting in political interests being prioritised at the expense of community wellbeing.  
Hanyane and Nkabe (2012) and Hanyane and Motsoeneng (2013) argued that because of the 
2011 local government elections, political parties had popularised sanitation issues around 
unenclosed toilets in informal settlements such as Makhaza and Rammolutsi as a political show 
of failed service delivery by opposing political parties. 
With the breakdown of the PSC and the departure of the KDF and SANCO (the elected 
representatives of the community), the figures who then took on the role of community leaders 
were either directly appointed by the City or its consultants or had political affiliations that 
would bring their involvement into question. An example of one such individual was Andile 
Lili. Mr Lili was initially appointed by a civil contractor as a CLO to act in the best interests of 
the contractor. In addition, Mr Lili was also a well-known member and leader within the 
ANCYL.  
When the Project Steering Committee dissolved, it appeared that Mr Lili took on the role of 
community representative despite him being employed to have the contractor’s interests at heart 
and not being formally elected by the residents. Despite the conflict of interest which existed 
with his involvement in the project, Lili was confident that he was duly authorised to represent 
the community. This matter that was not agreed upon by government officials, as they found 
Lili’s role in the project to be illegitimate and self-serving.  
Ultimately Lili’s involvement was found to be questionable in the High Court ruling by Judge 
Erasmus, who further went on to say that his role in fact undermined the principle of community 
participation. In the High Court ruling, Judge Nathan Erasmus wrote that it “… is unfortunate 
that in the scramble for limited resources, which have to address the historical imbalances and 
to cater for immediate needs, it has become the subject of political contest and patronage as 





The consequences of failing to maintain the formal structures intended for community 
participation and political interference directly weakened community participation processes in 
Project Silvertown. This was because without their elected representatives, the community was 
left with partisan leadership. The illegitimate community leaders who then emerged 
manipulated the situation to boost their political motives, leaving the community as pawns 
instead of project owners, and weakened their power, voice and opportunity to better their 
environment.   
6.1.5  Disjunctions of UISP policy interpretation 
The analysis revealed a lack of understanding and misinterpretation of the policy throughout all 
spheres of government. When selecting funding structures to implement upgrading projects, the 
lack of common understanding of what the programme was designed for between local, 
provincial and national government resulted in the incorrect structure being selected. 
Furthermore, it seemed like the checks or mechanisms to prevent misinterpretation of the UISP 
were not adequately enforced or monitored during the project approval and throughout the 
project as a whole.  
The UISP states that the programme is idealised for facilitating in-situ upgrades of informal 
settlements as opposed to relocation housing projects (DHS, 2009). However, similar to 
findings by Fieuw (2015), data analysed on Project Silvertown revealed that the funding 
structure was also being used to finance housing relocations that were intended to be financed 
under a separate funding structure. Fieuw (2015) found that when the UISP was introduced, 
government officials were not familiar with what the programme intended to achieve regarding 
in-situ upgrades. Because of this, an increasing number of projects, which claimed to be in-situ 
upgrades, made use of methodologies such as rollover developments and relocations, which did 
not fit the model intended by the UISP. 
An example from Project Silvertown was the different policy interpretations among officials in 
local, provincial and national government regarding the funding structures and the control of 
finances. Local government believed control of financing structures and funding fell under 




To the CoCT’s understanding, because the project had been approved under the UISP, they 
could not seek additional funding for individually enclosed toilets. Their interpretation of the 
UISP was that provisions for interim sanitation services were limited to communal toilets.  
Provincial government, however, interpreted that the programme gave responsibility of funding 
to national government. Their understanding was that, because the City had applied under the 
UISP for funding for such interim services, the City was given budget adequate for such 
development.  
National government, however, believed that ultimately, funding allocation was the 
responsibility of provincial government. They also stated that, on the matter of communal 
toilets, both the City and provincial department had misinterpreted the UISP, as the programme 
did not make provision for interim services.  
The City’s misinterpretation of the UISP only budgeting for communal toilets as an interim 
service negatively impacted the participation process and overall success of the participatory 
upgrade. This is because the interpretation of a fixed budget allocation for the sanitation services 
did not allow for alternative sanitation options to be proposed or considered by beneficiaries.  
The lack of coordination between the three spheres of government compromised the success of 
the Project Silvertown participatory upgrade. Data analysed revealed that the misinterpretation 
concerning who was primarily responsible for the funding of the UISP project became a divisive 
factor during the court case where one of the spheres had to be found accountable. While the 
UISP gave the bulk of the responsibility with respect to financial resources to provincial 
government, it also encouraged partnership and co-operative governance among the spheres 
(DHS, 2009; 20).  
The ruling made by Judge Erasmus found that the City had indeed misinterpreted the 
programme on the matter regarding the provision of interim services.  He criticised the City for 
not seeking clarity from the national department, as the policy had given responsibility 




However, the UISP advocated that the national department should “actively participate” with 
the local and provincial government in matters relating to the upgrade to avoid decisions being 
made during the project based on the incorrect interpretation of the Code.  
This lack of coordination within government spheres affecting project success is in line with 
Tshikotshi’s (2009) findings where he attributes poor co-operative governance to the failure of 
improving the living conditions of residents. He then goes on to recommend that government 
intensify the concept of intergovernmental relations to improve the likelihood of project success 
(Tshikotshi, 2009).  
6.2 Critique of stakeholder perspectives to conceptual community 
participation frameworks 
With reference to the conceptual frameworks identified by Abbott discussed in Chapter 3.5, this 
section discusses alignments to the frameworks that can be seen in findings from the stakeholder 
disjunctions identified in Chapter 6.1. The two conceptual frameworks to be used for the 
critique are that of Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation and Paul’s three dimensional 
framework.  
Abbot argues that because Arnstein’s framework was designed for the urban poor in America 
it might not be directly applicable to development projects (Abbott, 1993). Although this model 
may not be applicable for Project Silvertown, the idea of applying participation processes at 
different intensities ties into the first disjunction identified in Chapter 6.1. The Silvertown 
Community leaders expected participation processes to be implemented at a level of intensity 
on rungs describing degrees of citizen power. The City of Cape Town, however, implemented 
community participation processes in rungs more related to rungs of tokenism where decision 
making powers are not given to beneficiaries. 
Paul’s framework finds discord in policy and practice on the notion of community 
empowerment and capacity building in community participation processes. He states that in his 
findings they emerged as being a low priority objective during project implementation, but were 
stressed as important in policy (Paul 1993). The findings in Project Silvertown are similar to 




allocation to this process, however, no recorded evidence of such capacitation was noted in 
responses from stakeholders. 
Regarding the instruments of community participation Paul (1987) states that there is a risk of 
ineffective facilitation if the field workers align themselves primarily as agents of the 
government or sponsor. In the case of Project Silvertown the closest stakeholder group that 
matched the field workers definition was Bergstan, a company from the Consultants group, who 
were employed by the CoCT to facilitate community participation. Findings from Project 
Silvertown revealed that because the Consultants group was employed by the Cape Town, they 
viewed them as the Client group, therefore, aligned their objectives to meet that of the City of 
Cape Town above the needs and preferences of the beneficiaries.  
6.3 Evaluation of CSH 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in large public infrastructure projects incorporating community 
participation processes, conflict among stakeholders can arise due to the divergence of issues 
such as values, beliefs or interests. Making use of the 12 CSH questions the methodological 
framework for this study proved to be a powerful tool for structuring these values, beliefs and 
interests held by stakeholders.  
Furthermore, CSH was also useful in helping to surface the contrasting worldviews of the 
different stakeholders in the given system of interest. The ability to contrast these views helped 
to identify points of disjunction among stakeholders, thus revealing how these disjunctions 
affected the overall success of the participatory upgrade. Despite the value the CSH framework 
brought to this research study it was not without its limitations.   
The limitations of the use of CSH, to a large extent, occurred due to the adapted methodology 
used for this study. The prescribed application to obtain answers to the CSH questions is for 
participants to answer the 12 questions directly. However, for this study, a textual analysis of 
documentary data was done, using the CSH to structure the data found and develop answers to 
the questions based on the grouped data. Answers to the CSH questions in the ideal/ought mode 
were constructed using data obtained from the UISP as well as from project planning documents 




programme intended for projects of this nature to be implemented. Project planning 
documentation was used to frame the ought mode particularly relating to Project Silvertown to 
frame how the project ought to have been administered. To answer questions in the is mode 
data from sources such as affidavits, newspaper clippings and articles were used to construct 
answers from each stakeholder group. Although contrary to the prescribed application of CSH, 
the modification made to the framework served as an effective adaptation to analysing the 
textual data sourced. 
The rigidity imposed by the 12 CSH questions was also a limitation in this study. Through a 
reading of the raw data it became evident that there were additional factors and disjunctions 
which occurred throughout the upgrade so that the 12 CSH questions could not surface. An 
example of this would be the complexity brought about by the political tensions within the 
project the CSH questions could not address directly.  
In his paper, Tempelhoff (2012) stated the major role politics played in the breakdown of this 
project was particularly due to the fact that local government elections were nearing during the 
time when the protest action started. The CSH questions could not adequately address these 
nuances, which limited a broader understanding of the overall climate and interests of 
stakeholders involved and affected at the time. Despite the limitations resulting from the 
adapted use of CSH, overall the use of CSH in this study was beneficial in contributing to a 
rigorous analysis of the data available.   
In summary, the findings revealed that the following disjunctions in perceptions and 
expectations affecting the success of the Project Silvertown participatory upgrade were the 
different stakeholder expectations of community participation and decision-making, the 
differing stakeholder visions for project outcomes, poor capacitation of community members, 
disjunction of community representation by legitimate community leaders and disjunctions of 
UISP policy interpretation. Despite the limited data available, the CSH methodological 
framework used for this research study was effective in organising the documentary data 





7 Conclusions and recommendations 
This chapter summarises the research conducted, highlights the key findings which emerged 
from the data analysed, points out the limitations noted in the study and finally, provides 
recommendations as well as possibilities for future investigation.  
This study set out to investigate the implications, disjunctures and convergences that key 
stakeholders in informal settlement upgrades have towards strengthening participatory projects 
in such public infrastructure upgrades. To determine this interrelationship, two research 
questions were asked. The first question asked was what perceptions and expectations different 
stakeholders had in public infrastructure projects. The second question asked what implications 
these different perceptions and expectations had towards the success of participatory sanitation 
upgrades.  
Critical systems heuristics was the methodology applied for this research. The CSH framework 
of 12 questions allowed for the disjuctures and convergences among stakeholder groups to 
surface and be analysed in a structured manner. To set up what CSH identifies as the 
“normative” or “ideal” state which describes what the situation ought to be, data from the UISP 
as well as the initial project documentation for Project Silvertown was used. For the “actual” 
state, perceptions of the identified stakeholder groups were used with the data being collected 
from affidavits, newspaper clippings and newspaper articles.  
7.2 Key findings 
The residents’ perspective in an ideal scenario was that, in public infrastructure upgrades, they 
ought to be the clients with their interests being met. Furthermore, decision-making processes, 
they believed, in the joint partnership with the City on important decisions. Regarding 
knowledge contributions, residents believed they had valuable contextual knowledge to 
contribute to the project success. Their actual experience was that the City had complete 
autonomy over the decisions made and that the project was working to serve only the City’s 
interests. The residents also believed that the City had failed to manage the financial resources 




Similar to the views of residents, community leaders envisioned working in partnership and 
collaboration with the City of Cape Town. They hoped the environment would be such that it 
would allow them to emancipate the feelings, choices and preferences of the residents whom 
they represented. However, in reality they perceived that the City did not want to engage with 
them in a meaningful manner or take their considerations and knowledge contributions 
seriously. They believed that the City had the necessary resources to provide them with the 
sanitation solution they had requested. However, because of their race and socio-economic 
status the City opted for a cheap solution and expected them, as beneficiaries, to not complain 
and take whatever solution was given to them. Community leaders believed they had the best 
interests of the residents at heart and that owing to the lack of cooperation from the City, they 
had to resort to protest action to have their voices heard. 
The City of Cape Town believed that both the residents and the CoCT had interests that needed 
to be met with the completion of Project Silvertown. They believed that they had taken the 
concerns and knowledge contributions of the residents and community leaders into 
consideration. However, because of the financial constraints and limitations set up by the UISP 
they were not able to provide the residents with toilet enclosures. In their efforts to engage with 
community leaders and the residents they believed that the decision to install unenclosed toilets 
was made in collaboration with the beneficiaries.  In their opinion, the protest action which 
came about was the result of the direct influence of the opposing political parties who wanted 
to bring the local ruling party into disrepute.  
The consultants were the only stakeholder group to clearly identify a client in Project 
Silvertown, namely the CoCT. As they were under the employment of the City, they sought to 
meet the needs and interests of the City of Cape Town. They viewed the residents as 
beneficiaries of the services they were providing, and fulfilled the community participation 
requirements as directed by the City. 
Five major disjunctions of perceptions and expectations among the stakeholders were found to 
have had negative implications on the success of participatory upgrades: 
1. Different stakeholder expectations of community participation and decision- making  




3. Poor capacitation of community members 
4. Disjunction of community representation by legitimate community leaders 
5. Disjunctions of UISP policy interpretation 
The findings showed that the UISP policy was interpreted differently by all three spheres of 
government. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that, on issues relating to community 
participation, the UISP policy was ambiguous regarding what requirements were expected from 
municipalities. This left the responsibility to the municipalities to interpret the Code and employ 
mechanisms for implementation. While the national government was meant to support local 
municipalities with their interpretation, in the case of Project Silvertown they failed to deliver 
on this requirement. 
There was no alignment between the City and beneficiaries of the upgrading project regarding 
the vision of project success and what the outcomes were meant to achieve. Although this matter 
was brought to light in a community participation exercise, there was no noted attempt to 
reconcile the two visions to create a common goal which both parties favoured. With interests 
not being aligned, resulted in the stakeholder with the most power in the system (CoCT) ending 
up controlling the project motivation and vision, and side-lining the intended vision of the 
beneficiaries. 
While local government was satisfied with their community participation efforts, residents and 
community leaders felt undermined by the City of Cape Town. This was because community 
participation was not meeting the residents’ expectations with regard to having a shared of 
control in the decision-making processes. The community was also not adequately capacitated 
to be able to contribute in a more meaningful way in the project, which further undermined their 
involvement. Finally, illegitimate representation of the community and political motives also 
shifted the focus of the project away from serving the needs of the community to using the 






Participatory upgrades relating to water and sanitation in informal settlements remain a complex 
space requiring consideration of technical, financial, political and social issues. This research 
study brought to surface the difficult space participatory upgrades such as Project Silvertown 
are implemented and the context which community participation processes are conducted.  
The rigid structure of the CSH questions made it difficult to gain a holistic understanding of all 
the nuances within the project. This was particularly challenging, as limited textual data was 
the only resource used with no face-to-face interview responses, which could have painted a 
richer picture of the system of interest.  
A recommendation would be to replicate this research project with face-to-face interviews with 
some of the stakeholders mentioned in this project. This could be done by comparing the 
interpretations and findings of this study, and obtaining more robust answers to the questions 
asked to remove the limitations which arose from having access to limited textual data. Insights 
found in this study could be used to inform community participation processes to get more 
effective outcomes.  
It is also recommended that open-ended questions be asked in addition to the 12 CSH questions 
prescribed by the framework. This would help the researcher gain a richer understanding of the 
insights which had surfaced from the 12 CSH questions asked.   
Key action points for community participation practitioners based on the findings from this 
study would be to ensure alignment of the motivations for participatory upgrades like Project 
Silvertown from the start of the project. If stakeholders are found to have different motivations 
practitioners should attempt by all means to combine the different expectations to a joint vision 
that all stakeholders can agree upon. This would help strengthen relations between citizens and 
local government as well as better ensure project success.  
Capacitation of community members is important to ensure that beneficiaries know their rights 
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